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 “We would never accept the Japanese putting up a site next to Pearl 
Harbor. There's no reason for us to accept a mosque next to the World Trade 
Center.”Newt Gingrich said the above words in reference to the recent “ground-
zero mosque debate”, a heated media controversy which surrounded plans for the 
Park 51 Islamic Community Center to open in downtown Manhattan on the 10
th
 
anniversary of the September 11
th
 attacks. Assuming a necessary enmity between 
America and Islam, Gingrich’s claims seem rooted in the theory of a “Clash of 
Civilizations”. This theory envisions “the West” and “Islam” as diametrically 
opposed entities with no common values, and has become widely pervasive in 
informing much of post-9/11 America’s political and academic discourse. When 
chalked up against the social, cultural, and literary history of Islam, however, the 
Clash of Civilizations theory is a poor fit. For medieval Arabo-Islamic culture 
saw a vast rise of humanistic literature bearing a clear multi-civilizational 
influence. The Letters of the Goodwill Brothers of Basra constitute one of the 
most overlooked of these works. Composed by a group of 10
th
 century Abbasid 
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Muslim littérateurs, the 52 Letters draw parallels between the teachings of Islam 
and those of prior great wisdom traditions, including Indian and Ancient Greek 
wisdom, Judaism, and Christianity. Focusing on the way the Letters frame Islam 
in the context of perennial human wisdom, I show how this text is ultimately an 
irenic text aimed at promoting religious tolerance and cooperation in the 
tumultuous sectarian atmosphere of 10
th
 century Abbasid Iraq. I argue ultimately 
that the irenic message of the Letters presents an alternative narrative to the Clash 
of Civilizations theory, a narrative of tolerance from the Islamic past by which our 
own society may benefit when it comes to the relationships between American 
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“Nazis don't have the right to put up a sign next to the Holocaust Museum in 
Washington. We would never accept the Japanese putting up a site next to Pearl 
Harbor. There's no reason for us to accept a mosque next to the World Trade 
Center.” (Woodward, par. 18). 
 
The above words were said not too long ago by Republican congressmen Newt 
Gingrich, currently a frontrunner in the 2012 presidential race. Somewhat ironically 
enough, they were said in response to plans for the construction of the Park 51 Islamic 
Community Center, a building that is neither a mosque nor located at the World Trade 
Center site. The New York Imam behind the Park 51 project, Imam Feisal Abdul Rauf, 
envisioned the center as a public recreational and educational space for the lower 
Manhattan population. He envisioned Park 51 as a means whereby New York City’s long 
standing Muslim residents might be able to give back to the greater community, doing 
their part to help the latter heal beyond the tragic events of 9/11. ("Build That Mosque.", 
par. 5). Yet the goodwill expressed by Rauf did not stop a prominent American politician 
from offhandedly equating the world’s second largest religion with Nazism. On what 
assumptions has Gingrich made this extreme comparison? In likening Islam to America’s 
WWII military enemies, Gingrich’s claims seem in part to assume that there exists and 
always has existed a necessary dichotomy and conflict of interest between “Islamic 
values” on the one hand and “American values” on the other. His claims appear to 
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involve the assumption that “Islamic culture” and “Western culture” are in necessary 
political, social, and ideological conflict. Further evidence of the presence of such an 
assumption in Gingrich’s thinking can be seen in some of his subsequent objections to the 
“ground-zero mosque”: 
The folks who want to build this mosque — who are really radical Islamists who 
want to triumphally prove that they can build a mosque right next to a place 
where 3,000 Americans were killed by radical Islamists — those folks don't have 
any interest in reaching out to the community. They're trying to make a case about 
supremacy. (Woodward, par. 6) 
Unfortunately, this problematic and misguided assumption of necessarily conflict 
between “America” and “Islam” is not limited to the claims of Gingrich alone, but rather 
misinforms a great deal of contemporary discourse surrounding the status of Muslims in 
the United States. In the final analysis, the assumption that Islam and “America” are 
fundamentally at odds appears to be based upon the theory of a “Clash of Civilizations”, 
a theory of human interaction which has become widely pervasive in political and 
academic circles. First formalized by Samuel Huntington in 1993, the “Clash of 
Civilizations” theory conceptualizes the global population as consisting of a handful of 
monolithic, rigid “civilizations”, each which has developed historically independent of 
the others in culture and values, and each “civilization” therefore by nature predisposed 
toward conflict with the others. Defining a civilization, Huntington writes: 
Arabs, Chinese, and Westerners… are not part of any broader cultural entity. 
They constitute civilizations. A civilization is thus the highest cultural grouping of 
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people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that which 
distinguishes humans from other species…. Differences among civilizations are 
not only real; they are basic. Civilizations are differentiated from each other by 
history, language, culture, tradition, and, most important, religion.…. These 
differences are the product of centuries. They will not soon disappear (24-25).  
Based on the above observations, Huntington predicts that the principle source of conflict 
in the post-Cold War era will not be ideological or economic, but cultural. “The fault 
lines between civilizations,” He writes, “will be the battle lines of the future” (22). 
In examining the intellectual and social history of Islam, however, one finds 
apparent counter-examples to the Clash of Civilizations theory which are so abundant 
that they strongly compel us to reject the later as uninformative, if not harmful altogether. 
For the Arabo-Islamic Middle Ages witnessed the production and widespread 
proliferation of various forms of humanistic literature.
1
 Not only did this humanistic 
literature revitalize, incorporate and build upon the knowledge of civilizations which 
preceded Islam, such as that of the Ancient Greeks, the Persians, or the early Christians; 
but much of it also influenced the thought of the civilizations which came after Islam. Yet 
despite the breadth of humanistic literature from the Islamic Middle Ages which has 
survived until today, relatively very little of this literature has been translated from 
Arabic, and even less has received the critical engagement and analysis it deserves on the 
part of contemporary academic scholars. Of all of these largely overlooked works of 
                                                          
     
1
.  For a comprehensive account of the various forms of humanist literature of the 
Islamic middle ages, and the different kinds of learning institutions which gave rise to 
this literature, see Makdisi, especially chapters 1 and 2. 
4 
 
humanistic literature from the Medieval Muslim world, one of the most significant in its 
dire need for greater engagement is a text known as Rasā’il Ikhwān al-Ṣafā’ or The 
Epistles of the Goodwill Brethren.   
The Epistles of the Goodwill Brethren form collectively one of the most 
fascinating, unique, and thought-provoking pieces of literature that came out of the early 
Islamic Middle Ages. Written in an Arabic whose style is at once clear and concise yet 
creative and poetic, the 52 Epistles treat subjects ranging from mathematics and music to 
ancient philosophy, Qur’anic exegesis, and the nature of God; a diversity of subject 
matter that has lead many scholars to refer to The Epistles as an Islamic Encyclopedia 
(Marquet 1073 ). As the Brethren themselves spell out in the introductory index, or 
fihrist, the 52 Epistles are divided into four general subsections, each with its own major 
theme. The first section, entitled “The Mathematical” (al-riyāḍiyah), contains 14 Epistles 
dealing primarily with theoretical and abstract sciences, and appear to be strongly 
influenced by Pythagorean thought. The next 17 Epistles fall under a heading entitled 
“The Natural” (al-ṭabī‘iyah). Bearing titles the likes of “Species of Animals” (aṣnāf al-
hayawān) and “The Makeup of the Body” (tarkīb al-jasad), these Epistles seem to reflect 
the Aristotelian pursuit of the descriptive and empirical understanding of the natural 
world. The next 10 Epistles belong to a section entitled “al-nafsāniyah al-ʻaqliyah”, 
which translates roughly to “The Psychological and Rational”. They seem to deal mainly 
with the sciences of logic, first causes and principles, and the characterization of the 
human intellect and the limits of its power.  The final 11 Epistles fall under a section 
entitled  “The Theological and Religious” (al-nāmūsiyah wal-ilāhiyah wal-shar‘iyah wal-
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dīniyah), and seem to deal mostly with metaphysical and spiritual questions pertaining to 
Islamic practice and religious interpretation.  
Yet despite the Brethren’s categorization of The Epistles under these four 
ostensibly distinct themes, it is important to note that the boundaries in content between 
each epistle are ultimately quite porous. The Ikhwān often speak about the same general 
themes several times in every epistle regardless of the specific heading under which the 
Epistle is said to fall. In this regard, the categorization of The Epistles into four sections is 
perhaps more misleading than it is informative. For the most common of the over-arching 
themes that appear to run throughout the work as a whole is the importance of the pursuit 
of knowledge and wisdom as a means for the betterment of the human condition and the 
salvation of the human soul. I read The Epistles therefore not so much an abstract 
philosophical treatise, but a practical integration of philosophical wisdom for the greater 
purpose of educating the reader about how to better himself. On this theme, more will be 
said shortly. 
No less fascinating than the character of The Epistles is the character of the 





this collective of individuals labored to compose, copy, and circulate The Epistles, and 
                                                          
     
2
 . The precise period of the 10
th
 century in which the Ikhwān were active is to this day 
the subject of controversy among scholars. Some scholars, most notably F. Dieterici and 
Massignon, suggest that The Epistles date from around the 960’s to the 980’s. Marquet 
has suggested that The Epistles could have been written as early as 909. Paul Cassanova 
differs even further, and has actually placed the composition of The Epistles in the 11
th
 
century, between 1047-1051. For a more detailed and up to date discussion of the dating 




they did so in anonymity.
3
 As central as The Epistles are to Islamic intellectual and social 
history, however, relatively few thorough studies of this text exist in English.
4
 Of those 
that do exist, few approach The Epistles of the Goodwill Brethren as a work of Islamic 
literature.   
Much of secondary scholarship around the Ikhwān, in my view, has been 
concerned with issues ultimately peripheral and tangential to the content of The Epistles 
themselves, or guided by models of analysis which are entirely problematic when applied 
to the historical period in which the Ikhwān lived. These problems with the secondary 
scholarship are best understood via some concrete examples from some of the larger and 
more recent studies of the Ikhwān that have been published.   
One problematic question which has informed recent scholarship is the question 
of the specific ideological location of the Ikhwān vis-a-vis “orthodox” Islam. In his book 
                                                          
     
3
.  The question of the Brethren’s identities and the reasons behind their anonymity is 
one that has long puzzled scholars. This issue will be returned to shortly, and own my 
attempt to address it will form a substantial portion of this work. 
 
     
4
.  Based on my own research, the two most readily available and current thorough 
books dealing exclusively with The Epistles seem to be the works of Neton and de 
Callataӱ, both which take a primarily historical approach. Some other works exist that 
mention the ideas of the Ikhwān in the greater context of Islamic philosophy and 
cosmology. See, for example, Nasr’s Introduction to Islamic Cosmologial Doctrines. 
Besides works like the former, there exist only a few English translations of selected 
epistles with brief introductory remarks and commentary. See Baffioni, Epistles of the 
Brethren of Purity: On Logic : an Arabic Critical Edition and English Translation of 
Epistles 10-14. See also: van Reijn. Finally, there appears to exist a handful of scholarly 
articles on The Ikhwān, most of the former dating to the mid twentieth century. These 
articles mostly seem to be concerned with questions relatively tangential to the content of 
The Epistles, such as the proper dating of the work and the effort to uncover the identities 
of the Ikhwān. See: Stern, “The Authorship of the Epistles” and “New Information about 




Muslim Neoplatonists. An Introduction to the Thought of the Brethren of Purity
5
, Ian 
Richard Netton denies that the Ikhwān can be seen as “orthodox” Muslims in any real 
sense. Netton writes in his conclusion:     
 
The Ikhwān appear, perhaps, reluctant Muslims. Yet they have been described as 
truly Islamic because of a belief that what was historically eclectic in the Rasāʼil 
was gathered together with one Islamic end in mind, and that their aim was “to 
build a unified citadel”. According to this view the multiplicity of the Ikhwān’s 
source material was thus funneled to a unicity or single purpose which was the 
Islamic God and the Islamic exaltation of His oneness. This might have been an 
attractive way of viewing the Ikhwān were it not for the fact that, as has been 
shown, the Ikhwān’s concept of God differed radically from that of orthodox 
Islam; and, indeed, many of their beliefs were entirely outside the pale of Islam. A 
better way of considering the Ikhwān’s thought might be to see it as a series of 
lines radiating outwards and touching the circumference of world beliefs rather 
than as a variety of schools of thought and religious beliefs beamed inwards on 
the focus of Islam. It is true that the Ikhwān too had a single focus for which they 
derived inspiration and support from the many beliefs with which they came into 
contact, but that focus was the universal concept of purity, and not Islam. [My 
Emphasis] (107) 
                                                          
     
5
 .  The Brethren of “Purity”  is a very common translation employed in the field by 
scholars who deal with Ikhwān al-Ṣafā’. A second commonly employed translation is that 





Netton concludes further that the vast majority of subject matter covered in The 
Epistles is that which is “alien” to Islam: 
 
One scholar has asked in what way the Rasāʼil can be considered ‘a successful 
integration of Islam and Greek philosophy’…. the Rasāʼil cannot be described as 
successfully integrating either of these central features of the medieval Middle 
East though, of all the influences and alien strands which compose the woof of the 
Rasā’il, the Greek may be said to predominate. (107) 
 
Yet who gets to decide which brand of Islam is “orthodox” and which is not? 
Who gets to decide what is “alien” to the religion and what is not? On what basis must 
we conclude ipso facto that Greek ideas are necessarily “alien” to Islam? In looking at the 
nature of Islam in the 10
th
 century, the answers to these questions are anything but clear 
and unequivocal as Netton seems to assume. For the 10
th
 century was a period in which 
“orthodox” Islam as we understand it today had yet to crystallize and proliferate. The 
four Sunni madhāhib that today form the legal backbone of orthodox Sunni Islam were in 
the 10
th
 century still inchoate in their formation at best, and these interpretive schools 
existed among and competed with hundreds of other schools of thought, each which had 
its own unique viewpoint to offer on the question of “proper” Islamic practice and piety.
6
 
The period in which the Ikhwān lived and worked, then, was a period in which the 
                                                          
     
6
.  For a detailed discussion of the various and often conflicting notions of Islamic 
piety that existed during this period, See Hodgson 359 – 409. 
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question of what it means to be a Muslim and what it means to practice Islam was 
constantly and continually being negotiated and re-negotiated. This negotiation of the 
Islamic identity all too often took place violently in the form of civil strife or sectarian 
rebellion, and the 10
th
 century in particular was a time in which the Muslim ummah saw 
serious threats to its political and social stability due to violent upheaval.  
The early part of this century saw the rise of the revolutionary and esoteric 
Ismāʻīlī Shīʻīs (Hodgson 378-79). Named after Muhammad ibn Ismā’īl, the seventh 
Imam whom they believed to have gone into occultation and who would one day return 
in order to rule supreme, some Ismāʻīlī’s hoped to overthrow the Abbasid government 
and to establish a caliphate in line with their doctrines so as to make way for the final 
return of the seventh Imam (Berkey 138- 39). Under the guidance of their leader ʻUbayd 
Allah, a group of Ismaʻīlī’s known as the Fatimids conquered Egypt in 969, establishing a 
rival caliphate centered in Cairo (Berkey 138). Through mainly clandestine means, 
Ismā‘īlī missionaries were active in several parts of the Muslim lands, spreading their 
da‘wás, or “callings” for revolutionary change in Islamic society (Berkey 137). A 
particularly radical branch of Ismāʻīlī’s  were known as the Qaramitians (al-qarāmiṭah). 
With a high presence in Iraq, they rejected the claims and approach of the Fatimid’s. The 
Qaramitians were known particularly for their violent attacks on Abbasid caravans 
passing through the desert on their way to the holy cities of the Arabian peninsula. In 930 
they managed to besiege and conquer Mecca during the time of the pilgrimage, killing 
thousands of Muslim pilgrims and even stealing the Black Stone from the holy kaʻbah, 
which the Abbasids managed to reclaim only in 951 after paying a hefty sum in ransom 
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(Berkey 138-39). Moreover, In the mid 10
th
 century the character of Abbasid society was 
significantly altered when Baghdad fell under the de facto control of the Buyid’s, an 
Iranian dynasty which was Twelver Shīʻī in leaning (Hodgson 495). While the Abbasid 
caliph retained formal recognition as an abstract symbol of unity for the Islamic ummah, 
it was the Buyid kings that came to wield the actual political power, ruling in several 
internal provinces of the evermore fragmented Islamic empire (Hodgson 495; 
Mottahedeh 28). It was under the patronage of the Buyid’s that the first comprehensive 
Shī‘ī materials were composed and formalized, gradually carving out and expressing the 
first semblances of a formalized sectarian identity for Shīʻī Islam, and eventually 
provoking in response the first sectarian claims of Sunni Islam as a direct response to 
Shīʻism (Mottahedeh 22-24). Finally, in the later part of the 9
th
 century, the southern part 
of Iraq saw a revolt of African slaves (called by the name zanj) which served to further 
the underlying instability in the Abbasid empire (Berkey 141). This revolt was 
spearheaded primarily by Muhammad ibn ʻAlī, who was associated with a sectarian 
Islamic group known as the Kharijites, an obscure purist sect that emerged in the seventh 
century in harsh opposition to the Umayyads (Berkey 141). In the mid-seventh century, 
one group of Kharijites wreaked havoc upon the populations of southern Iraq and Iran. 
Their leader, Ibn al-Azraq, had held that any Muslim who refused to join the Kharijites 
could justifiably be murdered (Berkey 87).  
Yet as much as the negotiation of Islamic identity and practice took place through 
violence, it also took place peacefully via intellectual exchange within a bustling and 
vibrant marketplace of ideas. The Ikhwān were just one of many segments of early 
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Medieval Islamic society  who participated in this great interpretive struggle via the later 
means, putting forth their ideas to the public via the pen while shunning use of the sword. 
Questions about the “orthodoxy”, of the Ikhwān then, are entirely anachronistic, for they 
seek to analyze the work of the Ikhwān based on a concept of orthodoxy which in no 
clear sense really existed during their time. Such questions, then, form what I call the 
problematic Discourse of Orthodoxy. This “discourse of orthodoxy” is not only present 
in the work of Netton, but it is present in the work of other scholars as well.      
On the issue of orthodoxy, Historian Godefroid de Callataӱ seems to give the 
Islamic character of the Ikhwān an overall more balanced and charitable treatment 
relative to his colleague Netton. In criticism of Netton’s idea that the Ikhwān only quote 
the Quran superficially in order to conceal their “unorthodoxies”, de Callataӱ writes the 
following: 
 
Are we then to take it that the Brethren are using the Qur’an as a mere “cloak” or 
a “smoke-screen for doctrines which were entirely un-Qur’anic?” this is what 
Netton assumes (Netton 79). But it would imply that the Brethren were insincere, 
which does not ring true to me. (81) 
 
Yet though the quote above indicates a more moderate treatment of the Ikhwān on 
the part of de Callataӱ, the very title of his book – Ikhwān al-Safa’, A Brotherhood of 
Idealists on the Fringe of Orthodox Islam - indicates that his work is ultimately informed 
by the very same problematic “discourse of orthodoxy”. For, as has been argued above, 
12 
 
the Ikhwān lived in a period in which the location of the “fringe” and the location of the 
“center” were the continual subject of interpretive negotiation. A clear-cut distinction 
between “fringe” and “center”, then, could not be so easily drawn. 
Closely related to the Discourse of Orthodoxy is a second major problematic 
discourse which I see as informing much of the available secondary scholarship dealing 
with the Ikhwān. This second problematic I call the Shīʻī verses Sunni Discourse. Just as 
in the case of the first problematic, I will explain what I mean by this second problematic 
via a review of some of its examples in secondary scholarship. In the introduction to his 
work, de Callataӱ writes: 
 
There are two reasons why The Epistles were unacceptable to most Sunni 
Muslims (who constituted the majority then as now). First, they were clearly 
Shiʻite in nature, and second, they were patently philosophical, more precisely 
Neoplatonist or, as the great theologian Ghazali (d. 1111) would have it, 
Pythagorean. (ix) 
 
Yet I argue, in explicit disagreement with de Callataӱ, that because the concept of 
“orthodox” Sunni Islam was unclear during the 10
th
 century, so too was the line between 
“Sunnism” and “Shīʻism” not nearly as clear and distinct as it is in today’s Islamic world. 
During the 11
th
 century when he wrote, Al-Ghazālī, was just one of many differing voices 
on the subject of Sunni orthodoxy.  Even by in the 11
th
 century, the terms “Sunni” and 
“Shīʻī” were not regularized terms of the everyday Arabic lexicon like they are now. 
13 
 
Further, that the Ikhwān were “clearly Shiʻite in nature” is a claim which is scarcely 
supported by the text of The Epistles themselves, and seems to be more informed by an 
attempt on the part of scholars to frame the work of the Ikhwān within the context of a 
Sunni-Shīʻah historical meta-narrative. For though The Epistles do mention the concept 
of the imams (al-aʻimah) in several places while employing the word shīʻah occasionally, 
these terms are used in a manner which reflects at best a very protean notion of what we 
today might call “shīʻism” verses “sunnism”. It is unclear whether the use of the word al-
aʻimah within The Epistles explicitly refers to the bloodline of Muhammad instead of 
simply to referring in a more general way to the successors of all of the prophets in the 
plural sense (al-aʻimah alladhīna hum khulafā’ al-anbiyāʼ). Further, the word shīʻah in 
the text seems most of the time to take on its non-technical Arabic meaning of “faction” 
or “party” rather than specifically referring to that particular faction which supports ʻAli, 
known then as shīʻat ʻAli, a phrase which subsequently became shortened to al-shīʻah 
(the faction) in order to signify “the shīʻis” as a collective group. Though the word shīʻah 
occurs a handful of times in the text of the Ikhwān, nowhere does the specific phrase 
shīʻat ʻAli occur. During the time of the Ikhwān, the term most commonly used to refer to 
supporters of Ali was that of ‘Alawī, a term which did not carry the large “Shīʻī” 
sectarian connotation later imparted upon it.   
Despite these simple observations, however, many scholars have gone even 
further than de Callataӱ in their uncritical assertions that the Ikhwān’s goals were merely 
synonymous with those of “Shiʻism”. The Encyclopedia of Islam article on the Ikhwān, 
written by Y. Marquet, argues that the Rasā’il were Shīʻa  Ismaʻīlī political propaganda 
14 
 
designed to “rally men round the imām” (1074). Going even further, Abbas Hamdani has 
written a short article entitled: Brethren of Purity, a Secret Society for the Establishment 
of the Fatimid Caliphate. Yet I hold that conclusions such as these, which construe the 
Ikhwān as a politically subversive and clandestine propaganda organization, whose goals 
were synonymous with those of the Ismāʻīlī’s, are difficult to support via a direct reading 
of the text itself, and therefore appear strained at best. For while The Epistles perhaps 
might be loosely comparable to the writings of the great Isma’ilī dāʻī  Abū Yaʻqūb al-
Sijistānī (d. 971) in so far as both works bear significant Neoplatonic themes, Paul 
Walker has suggested that the sheer eclecticism of the Ikhwān in approach makes it 
difficult and problematic to directly associate them with the philosophical and political 
aims of Ismāʻīlism (Early Philosophical Shiism 166). Elsewhere, Walker suggests that 
the receptive and integrative stance the Ikhwān took toward philosophy was different in 
nature from the stance of Ismāʻīlī writers, this latter view which Walker describes as “an 
ambiguous position that rejects and accepts philosophy, both at the same time” (Early 
Philosophical Shiism 189). Just as the Discourse of Orthodoxy is anachronistic to the text 
of The Epistles, then, so too is the Sunni verses Shiʻi discourse anachronistic to this text, 
and thereby can only obscure the purposes of the Ikhwān rather than clarify and elucidate 
them.  
A third and final problem with secondary scholarship is that many of the articles 
written about the Ikhwān have been concerned only with superficial details such as the 
exact historical dating of The Epistles, or the specific identities of the authors; both, 
15 
 
again, at the expense of a deeper analysis of and engagement with the ideas in the text 
itself.  
These ideas are indeed engaging, and they appear overall quite pluralistic in 
character and theme. Not only do the philosophical and theological ideas extant in The 
Epistles hail from a diverse array of cultures, but they also reflect a breadth of times and 
places, from ancient Greece and India to the times of Moses, Christ, and Muhammad. 
Further, all of these times and places are brought together in The Epistles according to 
one central unifying theme: that of the human being and the salvation of the human soul 
through knowledge. Based on my own reading of The Epistles, then, I propose that the 
most immediate aim of the Ikhwān in writing them was to integrate philosophical and 
religious wisdom for the purpose of bettering the essential human condition in this life 
and in the hereafter. For the Ikhwān seem to have recognized that the condition of being 
human is indeed a universal and divinely ordained condition – one necessarily shared 
among past ancestors and present peers regardless of more superficial differences in 
background, opinion, or ideology. The divine construal of the human being put forth time 
and time again in The Epistles is that of an innately rational being, who, through his will 
to use his intellect for the pursuit of knowledge, holds the keys to his own salvation both 
as a physical being in this world and as a spiritual being in the next world. I hold 
therefore that the goal of the Ikhwān in their composition and circulation of The Epistles 
was to employ perennial wisdom from the human past in order to remind their readers of 
the universality of the human condition and to thereby foster a dialogue of reconciliation 
among the varying religions, sects, and ideologies that made up the fabric of society 
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during their own time. I propose, then, that The Epistles of the Goodwill Brethren is 
first and foremost an irenic text which, by appeal to perennial human wisdom, 
argues for the practice of an Islam grounded in the ideals of toleration, cooperation, 
and coexistence between differing denominations and faiths. 
Based on this thesis, several questions must be asked. First there is the issue of 
translation alluded to in an earlier footnote. Why have so many scholars translated the 
term ṣafā’ in the name Ikhwān al-Ṣafā’ as “purity” or “sincerity”? The linguistic basis 
upon which the term “sincerity”  has been chosen as a translation for ṣafā’ is, frankly, 
very unclear. While the term “purity” is indeed one of the possible lexical translations of 
ṣafā’, it is not immediately clear how this translation is supposed to be faithful to the 
notion of ṣafā’ as it is related specifically to brotherhood. Moreover, use of term ṣafā’ 
and its derivations seems to occur rather often in The Epistles in context with notions 
such as friendship (ṣadāqah), and beneficence (karāmah), which makes the translation of 
“purity” for the word ṣafā’ seem even more out of place (Rasā’il 18,171, 188 ; vol. 4). 
The translation “Brethren of Purity”, then, is not only somewhat awkward, but it also 
appears to be inappropriate to context. Classical Arabic lexicons show us that several 
other possible definitions of ṣafā’ exist that might yield a more context appropriate 
translation of the phrase Ikhwān al-Ṣafā’. I have chosen my translation of “Goodwill” 
based on my consultation of Ibn Manẓūr’s 13
th
 century lexicon Lisān al-ʿArab, in which 
one of the most common terms used to define ṣafā’ is that of takhlīṣ, a the gerund of a 
transitive Arabic verb which refers to the act of redeeming, amending, or saving someone 
or something. takhlīṣ does not only refer to divine salvation by God, but it can simply 
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refer to one person’s aiding another so as to rescue him from a difficult predicament or 
problem. (“ṣ-f-w”, “kh-l-ṣ”). The term takhlīṣ therefore carries both divine and worldly 
overtones of liberation from hardship, trouble and strife. I am proposing that this takhlīṣ 
is the most clearly observable goal of The Epistles, for they place a strong emphasis 
throughout upon ridding 10
th
 century Islamic society of unnecessary suffering due to 
misguided sectarian conflict. As further evidence for the latter meaning of ṣafā’, Samer 
Ali has pointed out that the term has semantic origins in the rituals of atonement 
traditionally performed by Muslims during pilgrimage to the Black Stone of the Kaʻba, 
where one of the main rituals involves the pilgrims’ running along a course that lies 
between the two hills of al-Ṣafā’ and al-Marwa. Ali makes this observation in the context 
of analyzing a poem written for the caliph al-Muntaṣir by al-Buhtarī , in which the poet 
journeys to the Kaʻba and performs the atonement ritual in order to seek a sense of 
closure and reconciliation for the ummah after the murder of al-Mutawakkil which had 
plunged the community into a state of turmoil. Based on this analysis, Ali suggests that 
the term ṣafā’ carries a meaning of making amends and a “clearing of debt”, 
characteristic of goodwill (Arabic Literary Salons 145-48). 
I propose based on my reading of The Epistles, then, that the most basic aim of 
the Ikhwān was not one of sincerity or purity, but one of goodwill toward their society. 
As I hope to show over the course of this thesis, the sentiment of goodwill put forward in 
The Epistles is multifaceted and multilayered, being at once social, political, and spiritual 
in character. For now, suffice it to say that based upon both textual and linguistic 
evidence, I see “goodwill” to be the best translation for ṣafā’.    
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The second question has to do with the anonymity of the Ikhwān. The desire of so 
many scholars to know the exact identities of the Ikhwān has produced a great deal of 
historical research and an even greater amount of controversy that ultimately seems to 
end in an inconclusive deadlock. Instead of treating the question of author anonymity as a 
historical question of identity, then, I will treat this question as a literary question of 
meaning. Instead of asking the question: “What were the identities of the Ikhwān?”, 
therefore, I find it far more important to ask the following question: Given that the 
authors of The Epistles are anonymous, and how might the fact of this anonymity reflect 
and support a message of goodwill within the text itself? Chapter One will take up this 
later question in detail.  
Third, the question of the unique brand of humanism that develops in The Epistles 
has yet to be given sufficient attention. Why does a concern with defining the nature of 
the human being (al-insān) and the human soul (al-nafs) take such a central role in The 
Epistles, and how specifically does the Ikhwān’s conception of the human soul provide a 
framework whereby co-existence and greater tolerance among the disparate elements of 
their society might take place? This question will be the concern of Chapter Two. 
Fourthly, in order to understand how the Ikhwān sought to foster tolerance 
interreligious tolerance, we must first attempt to understand the role which perennial 
wisdom plays over the course of The Epistles. How specifically do the Ikhwān employ 
perennial truth from ages past in order to support their view of the human soul? In what 
ways and according to what principles do The Epistles draw parallels between the 
Muslim experience on the one hand and the Jewish and Christian experiences on the 
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other? How do The Epistles place Islamic thought about the human being and his ultimate 
destiny into dialogue with the humanist ideas of the ancient Greeks? Chapter Three will 
deal with questions like the former. 
In the conclusion, I will bring this thesis back full-circle to the issue which was 
raised at the very beginning. In doing so, I aim to answer the following question: How do 
The Epistles of the Goodwill Brethren as a piece irenic literature from the Islamic Middle 
Ages present a rebuttal to the Clash of Civilizations theory? In more concrete terms, how 
might the ideas of the Goodwill Brethren, though they came from a far away time, 
present an alternative to the highly prevalent “us verses them” language which informs so 
much of contemporary political discourse about the place of Muslims in American 
society? In answering these questions, I will argue for why I think The Epistles provide 
an excellent precedent from the Islamic past for the sort of co-existence, tolerance, and 
goodwill which is much needed today when it comes to the current state of relationships 
between Muslims and non-Muslims in the United States and in the world at large. I hope 
to support this argument by showing how The Epistles offer an alternative paradigm for 
viewing the assumed “clash” between Islam and the so-called “West”. This paradigm, 
contrary to the paradigm of deeply-rooted conflict and long-standing difference,  is one 




   
 
Chapter One 
Brotherhood, Friendship, and Community Through Anonymity:  
The Anonymity of the Ikhwān and its Relationship to their Irenic Goals 
 
The attempt of so many contemporary scholars of The Epistles to identify the 
proper names of the Ikhwān is highly ironic, for this attempt is driven by a modernist 
notion of authorship only. This contemporary notion of the “authorship” of a text is one 
which assumes that the author of that text is merely synonymous with the proper name of 
the individual who composed it.  
A particularly typical treatment of the Ikhwān’s anonymity in contemporary 
scholarship according to the former notion of authorship can be seen in the work of A.L. 
Tibawi, who argues that the anonymity of the Ikhwān arises from the fact that The 
Epistles constitute a piece of “subtle and secret propaganda” characteristic of the Ismāʻīlī 
Shīʻa daʻwá for the overthrow of the Abbasid state. (“Further Studies” 58). Tibawi 
writes: 
It was the Ismā’ili (sic) missionaries who made the movement [of propaganda] an 
educational instrument for achieving political and theological supremacy. By the 
fourth century A.H., the Sunni caliphate in Baghdad was in evident decline and 
Shīʻi vassals were gaining power in its dominions. But the most powerful 
challenge was the Fatimid mission in North Africa which recaptured Cairo. In the 
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cultural field the triumph of Shī‘ism was marked by the establishment of al-Azhar 
in Cairo and the dissemination of Rasāʼil Ikhwān as-Safā in Baghdad. (59).     
 
Yet I hold that A.L. Tibawi’s treatment of the anonymity question is misguided. 
For in applying the contemporary notion of authorship and anonymity to his analysis of 
the medieval Epistles, A.L. Tibawi obscures their unique content by simply equating the 
goals of the Ikhwān with those of clandestine Isma‘īlī Shīʻah “propagandists”. Because of 
a misguided approach to the anonymity question, then, A.L. Tibawi’s analysis ultimately 
falls prey to the problematic Sunni verses Shīʻah discourse which I described in the 
introduction. What I am proposing ultimately, then, is that when it comes to the unique 
work of The Epistles, the anonymity question must be treated according to a more 
dynamic and flexible concept of authorship, rooted less so in the historical notion of 
personal identity and more so in the literary concept of the functionality of the text.     
This need for an alternative understanding of authorship can best be elucidated by 
asking a couple of important questions. Should we really assume that the authorship of a 
text must necessarily be signified by a proper name? That is, does a proper name always 
signify “the author” of a text and as an imagined social and cultural being, or are the 
notions of “proper name” and “author” sometimes independent of one another? On closer 
contemplation there appears to be laden within the concept and role of “the author” a 
deeper complexity that far transcends the mere name of an individual. Consider, for 
example, the difference between the name “Samuel Clemens” and the name “Mark 
Twain”. Even though both of these names refer to the same “individual”, the latter name 
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carriers a cultural and literary signification which the former does not. Compared to the 
relatively lesser known name “Samuel Clemens”, the pen name “Mark Twain”  conjures 
up thought of Tom Sawyer and Huckleberry Finn, and the reverberating impact of these 
characters on American cultural discourse and memory. Michel Foucault’s critical re-
evaluation of the concept of “authorship” can help us elucidate this latter idea. In his 
essay “What is an Author?” Foucault writes: 
 
It would seem that the author’s name, unlike proper names, does not pass from the 
interior of a discourse to the real and exterior individual who produces it; instead, 
the name seems always to be present, marking off the edges of the text, revealing, 
or at least characterizing, its mode of being. The author’s name manifests the 
appearance of a certain discursive set and indicates the status of this discourse 
within a society and a culture. [My Emphasis] (107) 
 
In drawing this critical distinction between the individual’s proper name and the 
author’s name, Foucault argues that the latter is uniquely significant when it comes to our 
effort to interpret the meaning of a given text and the relationship of its discourse to the 
social space with which it interacts. Based on the Foucauldian understanding of 
authorship, then, far more important than the proper identity of the author of a text is the 
name given for the author and how this name participates in the formation of the text and 
its meaning. It is this unique influence of the name of the author upon the meaning of a 
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text which Foucault goes on to call the Author Function of a text (108). The Author 
Function, elaborates Foucault, 
 
does not refer purely and simply to a real individual, since it can give rise 
simultaneously to several selves, to several subjects – positions that can be 
occupied by different classes of individuals.  (113) 
 
If we take Foucault’s idea of the Author Function as our new point of departure, 
then, we arrive at that suggestion that instead of trying to know the identities of the 
“Ikhwān al-Ṣafā’”, we ought to analyze the name “Ikhwān al-Ṣafā’” itself . What is the 
relationship between the author name Ikhwān al-Ṣafā’ and the content and meaning of 
The Epistles? What, to borrow Foucault’s language, is the textual meaning of the name 
Ikhwān al-Ṣafā’, and how does this name define the functionality of The Epistles, 
characterizing their “mode of being” within the social and cultural space of 10
th
 century 
Islamic society?  Furthermore, how does the name Ikhwān al-Ṣafā’ operate within The 
Epistles so as to imagine a social space which may be occupied by a diversity of 
individuals from different classes and backgrounds? Through my analysis of the 
Author Function of the name “Ikhwān al-Ṣafā’” and how this function plays out in 
the text of The Epistles, I will argue ultimately that the Ikhwān’s anonymity as 




The most immediate way in which the author-name Ikhwān al-Ṣafā’ lends 
significance to the message of The Epistles can be seen in the ideal of brotherhood (al-
ukhūwah). For this ideal is among the most ubiquitous themes that run throughout the 
text of The Epistles of as whole. Yet despite its recurrent thematic importance at virtually 
every level of textual discourse within The Epistles, few scholars have made a serious 
attempt to analyze this notion of brotherhood – some scholars, as we have seen, having 
ignored it all together in favor of simply branding the Ikhwān with the goals of Ismaʻīlī 
Shīʻism. Yet the thematic prominence of brotherhood in The Epistles cannot be avoided, 
for it begs the following question: Why did the authors of The Epistles place such an 
enormous emphasis on brotherhood, and how is this emphasis upon brotherhood 
supposed to frame the encounter of the reader with the text?  
The beginning of the answer to this question can be seen in the fact that nearly 
every paragraph in the text of The Epistles is prefaced with the following statement: 
 
....أن –أيدك هللا وإيانا بروح منه  –أعلم يا أخي   
Know, O Brother – may God aid you and us with his mercy – that…(Rasā’il 53; 
vol. 1) 
The immediate function of this recurring statement, I propose, is to break down potential 
barriers between reader and author. For the reader of The Epistles is addressed 
continually as a brother. He is addressed as though he himself belongs to the fraternity of 
the Ikhwān, the later inviting him openly to consider himself part of this fraternity. For 
upon our reading the aforementioned statement, the distinction between “us” the reader 
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and “them” the Ikhwān seems to fade out of existence. In Foucauldian terms, this 
elimination of the traditional barrier between reader and author, I argue, creates an open, 
public space of brotherhood in which a wide range of different individuals may 
theoretically participate. Moreover, I hold that the creation of this public space of 
brotherhood is the very Author Function of the Ikhwān’s anonymity over the course of 
The Epistles, for had the text bore their proper names , then the creation of such a diverse 
and pluralistic space would have been difficult if not impossible. In the paragraphs that 
follow, I will examine how this public space of brotherhood develops over the course of 
The Epistles via a close analysis of some concrete examples from the text. 
The open invitation to a space of brotherhood can be seen most clearly in the 
Fihrist, the preface to The Epistles in which the Ikhwān summarize the overarching goals 
of their work. Immediately upon opening to the Fihrist, we see the Ikhwān make the 
following poetic introductory statement, again addressing their reader as a brother.   
      
بأن مثل صاحب هذه الرسائل مع طالبي العلم ومؤثري  –أيدك هللا وإيانا بروح منه  –و أعلم يا أخي     
حكيم جواد كريم، له بستان خضر نضر بهج مونق الحكمة ومن أحب خالصه، واختار نجاته، كمثل رجل 
معجب طيب الثمرات، لذيذ الفواكه، عطر الرياحين، أرجه األوراد، فائحة األزهار، بهية المنظر، نزهة 
المرامي، مختلفة األشكال واألصباغ، واأللوان والمذاق والمشام، من بين رطب ويابس وحلو وحامض، 
...صوات، الملهية األلحان، المستحسنة التغريدوفيها من سائر الطيور المطربة األ        
 
 Know, O brother – may God aid you and us with his mercy – that the holder of 
these epistles, along with those who seek knowledge, love wisdom, and choose its 
26 
 
furtherance, is like a noble and virtuous wiseman who possesses a verdant, 
miraculous garden with fruits succulent, delicious, and ripe. The scents of its 
flowers are wonderful. The view in this garden is beautiful, its sights pure and 
unblemished. It is diverse in its colors, tastes, and scents, which fall between wet, 
dry, sweet, and sour. And in this garden are many birds whose voices sing 
beautifully to sonorous melodies… (Rasā’il 43; vol. 1) 
 
The Ikhwān go on to describe this beautiful garden in great detail for several paragraphs, 
entreating the reader to strive to enter it through the betterment of himself and the seeking 
of knowledge and wisdom. The Ikhwān’s invocation of a garden here is very significant, 
as it is more than likely a reference to salvation in al-jannah or The Garden of Paradise 
which is the Islamic equivalent to heaven. This beautiful garden which the wiseman 
enters, then, is a not only a metaphor for the kind of world the Ikhwān wish to imagine, 
but ultimately a metaphor for the means to salvation. This means to salvation appears to 
be found in a the virtue of a contemplative character, of one who devotes himself in this 
life to seeking wisdom while also acting in accord with what it dictates. The Ikhwān seem 
to be telling us early on, then, that a central purpose of The Epistles is to cultivate a value 
for knowledge in their society and thereby to guide their contemporaries toward the path 
to salvation. This thematic relationship between wisdom in this world and salvation in the 
next appears to be quite common over the course of The Epistles, and it will be revisited 
in more detail shortly. Moreover, Samer Ali has pointed out that references to beautiful 
heavenly gardens much like the one above were quite common in Medieval Arabic 
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accounts of mujālasāt, urban literary gatherings in which individuals from various social 
strata came together to edify, educate, and entertain one another through the performative 
sharing of humanistic literature (adab). (Arabic Literary Salons 18). The Ikhwān, then, 
appear to be inviting the reader to participate in a kind of public social discourse in which 
knowledge and wisdom is exchanged between peers. 
In terms of rhetorical functionality, then, the Ikhwān’s anonymity as authors of 
The Epistles does not seem to have the effect of informing the reader that the knowledge 
therein is private, clandestine, and esoteric. Rather something like the opposite seems to 
be true. For The Epistles seem to be characterizing knowledge and wisdom as common 
means for the betterment of society, a means which therefore will be of greater benefit if 
spread far and wide. Accordingly, in the closing paragraphs of the Fihrist the Ikhwān 
explicitly beseech the reader of The Epistles to kindly share them with other people: 
 
أن يتقي هللا تعالى فيها بأن يهتم ويعتني بها غاية  . . .كذلك الواجب على من حصلت عنده هذه الرسائل   
والواد  العناية، وال يخل بهذه الوصاية، ويتلطف في استعمالها وإيصالها، تلطف األخ الشقيق، واألب الشفيق،
...الصديق، والطيب الرفيق  
 
 Furthermore, it is the duty of he who has found himself with these epistles . . . to 
take interest in them and to care for them with the utmost of care, and not to 
abandon this guardianship. In this endeavor he should be pious toward God and 
heedful against danger. He should be kind in using and transmitting these 
Epistles, and his kindness in doing so should be like that of a close brother, a 
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compassionate father, a dear friend, and a noble companion. (Rasā’il 45-46; vol. 
1).    
In the former statement we see the ideal of a public, open brotherhood taking shape in 
greater clarity. We learn that this is a brotherhood based in large part upon the 
cooperative sharing of wisdom between earnest and caring friends. This wisdom is 
thereby not the exclusive intellectual property of any one sect or ideological faction of 
society, but rather seems to be a kind of perennial or common wisdom, open to 
individuals by virtue of the fact that they pursue it. The essential message the Ikhwān 
seem to be trying to convey in the Fihrist, then, is that their Epistles are a recipe for the 
improvement of the human condition via a “pay it forward”  approach, whereby he who 
encounters The Epistles is to show his gratitude for the wisdom therein by passing this 
wisdom onto others in his community, who will in turn pass it on to even more 
individuals. 
The Ikhwān’s steadfast endorsement of the pay it forward approach to social 
altruism appears at its clearest in Epistle 44, entitled “A Statement of the Beliefs of The 
Goodwill Brethren” (Bayān ʻItiqād Ikhwān al-Ṣafā’). The Ikhwān begin this Epistle by 
telling a story of a doctor who manages to cure an entire town of an illness despite the 
fact that its inhabitants are initially hostile towards him, denying that they have any 
illness in the first place. The Ikhwān write: 
 
أعلم أنه كان في الزمان السالف ذكروا أنه كان رجل من الحكماء رفيقا بالطب، دخل إلى مدينة من المدن، 
فرأى عامة أهلها بهم مرض خفي ال يشعرون بعلتهم، وال يحسون بدائهم الذي بهم، ففكر ذلك الحكيم في 
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أمرهم كيف يداويهم ليبرئهم من دائهم ويشفيهم من علتهم التي استمرت بهم، وعلم أنه إن أخبرهم بما هم فيه 
ال يستمعون قوله وال يقبلون نصيحته، بل ربما ناصبوه بالعداوة، واستعجزوا رأيه، واستنقصوا آدابه، 
لهم تحننه عليهم، وحرصه على واسترذلوا عمله، فاحتال في ذلك لشدة شفقته على أبناء جنسه، ورحمته 
مداواتهم طلبا لمرضاة هللا، عز وجل، بأن طلب من أهل تلك المدينة رجال من فضالئهم الذين كان بهم ذلك 
المرض، فأعطاه شربة من شربات كانت معه قد أعدها لمداواتهم، وسعطه بدخنه، فعطس ذلك الرجل من 
في جسمه وقوة في نفسه، فشكر له وجزاه خيرا وقال ساعته ووجد خفة في بدنه، وراحة في حواسه، وصحة 
نعم، تعيني على : هل لك من حاجة أقضيها لك مكافأة لما اصطنعت إلّي من اإلحسان مداواتك لي؟ فقال: له
... سمعا وطاعة لك، فتوافقا على ذلك: قال.  مداواة أخ من إخوانك  
 
Know that a long time ago it was mentioned that there was a wise doctor. He 
entered a city and saw that most of its people had an illness they were unaware of. 
They did not feel their sickness, and they did not feel the presence of the illness in 
their bodies. So the doctor thought about their condition and how he might best be 
able to medicate them so as to cure them from their illness which had festered in 
them. He knew that if he told them directly about their illness they would neither 
listen to him nor accept his advice, but rather they might respond in hostility, 
ignoring his opinions and calling him a fraud. So the doctor, because of his pity 
for his fellow man, his longing for their wellness, and his adamant will to cure 
them so as to please God – glory to him – resolved to seek out a man of high 
status from among the town’s sick residents. He found this man and gave him a 
medicinal potion which he had prepared, and he also put some snuff in the man’s 
nose. The man sneezed and immediately realized that he felt well and healthy. 
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The man thanked the doctor, praised him, and said to him: “Is there anything I can 
do for you in return for your curing me of this illness?” The doctor said: “Yes, 
help me to cure one of your brothers.” The man said: “very gladly I will do this 
for you”. So the two men agreed upon this….  (Rasa’il 14-15; vol. 4). 
 
So the first man who was cured by the doctor brings him to a second man in the town 
who takes the potion and is himself cured. This second man, just as the first man did, 
thanks the doctor graciously and asks if there is anything he can do to repay the favor. In 
response, both the doctor and the first man ask the newly cured second man to pay it 
forward: 
 
تعيننا على : سان والمعروف، فقاالهل لكما حاجة أقضيها لكما مكافأة لما صنعتما إلّي من اإلح: وقال لهما
.مداواة أخ من إخوانك  
 
The second man said to both the doctor and the first man: “Is there anything I can 
do to repay you two for the good you have done for me?”. They replied: “help us 
to cure one of your brothers” (Rasā’il 15; vol. 4). 
 
This pay it forward paradigm continues gradually, indirectly, and in secret until many 
people in the town have received the cure. It is only once this secret group of cured grows 
sufficiently large that it finally announces the cure to society at large, having gained the 
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numbers, power, and influence necessary to systematically cure the entire town of the 
disease, even though some might still try to resist this cure. 
 
  
ثم تفرقوا في المدينة يداوون الناس واحدا بعد آخر في السر، حتى أبرؤوا أناسا كثيرا، وكثر أنصارهم 
وإخوانهم ومعارفهم، ثم ظهروا للناس وكاشفوهم بالمعالجة، وكابروهم بالمداواة قهرا، وكانوا يلقون واحدا 
رون كرها، ويسقونه جبرا حتى واحدا من الناس فيأخذ منهم جماعة بيديه وجماعة برجليه، ويسعطه اآلخ
.  أبرؤوا أهل المدينة كلها  
 
So the group of cured dispersed throughout the city, medicating people on by one 
in secret, until they had cured many people. Their support and influence grew, so 
that finally they revealed the cure to the public. Now that they formed a majority, 
they went around medicating every person one by one, sometimes by force when 
needed. A group of them would grab a person’s legs, another would grab his 
arms, and a third group would force him to take the potion. They did this until the 
entire town was cured of the disease (Rasā’il 15; vol. 4). 
 
We learn from this story, then, that anonymity is the central factor behind the 
ability of the pay it forward paradigm to work successfully. For had the doctor not at first 
kept his identity and his purpose anonymous to the majority of the town, he would have 
diminished his chances of one day successfully curing the whole town. For the doctor 
knew that simply announcing his purpose in front of the entire town at an assembly likely 
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would have resulted in his being cast off and ignored as an imposter or a malevolent 
outsider. The role of anonymity in this story, then, I argue, is a microcosm of the role of 
anonymity seems to play throughout The Epistles as a whole. Just as the doctor decides to 
keep his identity anonymous so that his cure may ultimately reach the greatest number of 
townspeople, so too it appears that the anonymity of the Ikhwān as authors gives rise to 
the potential for the ideas in The Epistles to ultimately influence the greatest number of 
readers. Therefore, anonymity in both the case of the doctor and of the Ikhwān operates 
as a rhetorical and persuasive device rooted in a kind of intellectual humility and 
patience. This gentle type of persuasion, based upon goodwill, is a prerequisite for 
productive cooperation to occur between people of different backgrounds. This later idea 
seems to be the moral of the story of the doctor, for the Ikhwān conclude this story by 
making the following plea to the reader: 
 
فكن أيها األخ مساعدا إلخوانك وموافقا ومناصحا، وينفع هللا بك العباد، ويصلح بك شأنهم، كما وعد هللا 
وقد سمعت في الخبر أن " ابعثوا حكما من أهله وحكما من أهلها إن يريدا إصالحا يوفق هللا بينهما: "فقال
خدع كل واحد صاحبه، ومكر، أضمر الحيلة والغل فيما يوفقوا في  الحكمين يوم صفين لم يريدا إصالحا، بل
.الصلح إلى طريق الرشاد، فرجع أمير المؤمنين غير راض بذلك الحكم  
 
So be – O Brother – a helper to your brothers. Be a source of counsel and 
benevolence for your brothers, and through you may God serve his children and 
better their affairs, as God promised when he said: “appoint (two) arbitrators, one 
from his family and the other from her's; if they both wish for peace, God will 
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cause their reconciliation”. [Quran 4:35]7 And you have heard the news that the 
two parties that fought on the day of the Battle of Ṣiffīn did not want resolution of 
their conflict, but instead each party deceived the other, conniving a host of 
rancorous tricks and ruses under the guise of true compromise. So the Caliph 
returned home not having benefited from those proceedings (Rasā’il 17; vol. 4). 
 
That the Ikhwān evoke the memory of the Battle of Ṣiffīn (657 CE) and lament its failed 
resolution is very significant for our understanding of their social and political ideals. The 
Battle of Ṣiffīn was just one reflection of an early Islamic community ravaged by what 
became remembered as the first Islamic Civil War, or the first  “fitnah”, (lit. “temptation” 
toward violence), an Arabic term with many negative shades of meaning that refers to 
political and social chaos, struggle, troubles, and strife (Hodgson 214; Berkey 71). 
Lasting from 656-661 CE, the first fitnah grew primarily out of the controversial and 
mysterious assassination of the third Islamic Caliph, ʻUthmān, and the resultant disputes 
over the legitimacy of ʻAlī ibn Abī Tālib as his successor to the caliphate (Hodgson 215). 
What is most important to note here however is that the Battle of Ṣiffīn and its stalemate 
of a resolution went down in Islamic historical memory as one of the principle conflicts 
that served to define and perpetuate the primary divide in Muslim society, that between 
the proto Shīʻah and the proto Sunnis -  a divide which first festered and solidified not so 
much via a theological conflict of ideology, but via the growth of mutual distrust and the 
subsequent breakdown of reconciliatory civil dialogue (Lecker 553). The memory of the 
                                                          
      
7
 . For my translation of Quran this verse I have consulted the work of Mohsin Khan. 
See: Khan 4:35  
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fitnah  and the gravity of the harm and trauma it caused to the early Muslim community 
remained burned into Islamic political consciousness for centuries to come (Lecker 555). 
The Ikhwān’s appeal to troubled memory of Ṣiffīn, then, strongly suggests that they saw 
as imperative the embracing of peaceful dialogue for the prevention of further  fitnah in 
Islamic society. Accordingly, it appears that the Ikhwān saw the encouragement of 
brotherhood, mutual assistance, and cooperation between members of their society as the 
best measure against the possibility of a new fitnah occurring. This measure for conflict 
prevention is the best measure possible specifically because it is preventative. For in 
making the concerted effort to form relationships of trust and mutual goodwill in the first 
place, the disparate members of a society enhance their abilities to resolve disputes by 
non-violent means. Moreover, in stating that the Caliph Ali did not benefit from the 
arbitration of Siffīn, the Ikhwān are perhaps directing a criticism against the Kharijites, 
who abandoned Ali during Siffīn specifically because he was trying to reach a 
compromise and political settlement with Muʻāwiya in order to end the fitnah (Berkey 
86). Relative to their own time, then, the Ikhwān’s memory of Siffīn might be best 
described as nonsectarian insofar as it was neither fully Shīʻī nor fully Sunni in 
sympathy. For while the proto-Shīʻa of the 10
th
 century tended to place most of the blame 
for Siffīn on Muʻāwiya’s side, while the proto-Sunnis placed more of the blame on the 
side of Ali, the Ikhwān seem to be distributing the blame equally on both sides for failing 
to fully embrace the peaceful negotiation process.    
      The notion of brotherhood grounded in anonymity throughout The Epistles, then, 
seems to be closely related to notions of promoting the common good or the public 
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interest. In other words, anonymity seems to be the core rhetorical device by which The 
Epistles conjure up ideals of cooperation and consensus building among different classes 
of individuals. For unlike a finite list of proper names which might imply certain 
exclusive ownership  for The Epistles, the anonymity of the name “Ikhwān” seems to 
suggest that The Epistles belong to the broader public itself, and that they might serve as 
a framework for the creation and preservation of productive social relationships grounded 
in the overarching ideal of ukhūwah. In the following passage from Epistle 2, for 
example, the Ikhwān characterize a well-functioning society as analogous to a household 
in which brothers cooperate well with one another, each doing his own part to maintain 
the welfare of the home. The Ikhwān write: 
   
بأن اإلنسان الواحد ال يقدر أن يعيش وحده إال عيشا نكدا، ألنه  –أيدك هللا وإيانا بروح منه  –أعلم يا أخي 
محتاج إلى طيب العيش من إحكام صنائع شتى، وال يمكن اإلنسان الواحد أن يبلغها كلها، ألن العمر قصير، 
وقد . والصنائع كثيرة، فمن أجل هذا اجتمع في كل مدينة أو قرية أناس كثيرون لمعاونة بعضهم بعضا
كمة اإلهلية والعناية الربانية بأن يشتغل جماعة منهم بإحكام الصنائع، وجماعة في التجارات، أوجبت الح
وجماعة بإحكام البنيان، وجماعة بتدبير السياسات، وجماعة بإحكام العلوم وتعليمها، وجماعة بالخدمة 
عاونين في أمر للجميع والسعي في حوائجهم، ألن مثلهم في كمثل أخوة من أب واحد في منزل واحد، مت
. معيشتهم، كل منهم في وجه منها  
 
Know, O Brother – may God aid you and us with his mercy – that the individual 
human being cannot live by himself except a miserable existence. For he is in 
need of a good life which can only come from the precise knowledge of a 
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diversity of crafts. The single human being cannot learn all of these crafts, for life 
is short and crafts are many. So for this reason many people gathered in every city 
or countryside in order to cooperate with one another. Divine providence has 
determined that some of them shall work in perfecting manufactured goods, some 
shall work in trade, some in architecture and construction, some in service to the 
public and pursuing their interest, some in the teaching and learning of the 
sciences, and some in the civil service. For all of these people are like the brothers 
from one father in one household, cooperating with regard to their living, each 
one of them responsible for a different aspect of the latter. (Rasā’il 99-100; vol. 
2).      
 
The above discussion of cooperative division of labor as the key to a successful society 
seems to suggest that the idealized  model of social and political interaction which the 
name “Ikhwān al-Ṣafā’” carves out and imagines for 10
th
 century Basran society is one 
which is grounded in the creation and maintenance of a healthy “public sphere” whereby 
problem-solving among a range of individuals of different occupations and social 
backgrounds may take place. Though it was J. Habermas who first described the notion 
of “a public sphere” in the context of 18
th
 century European society, I am indebted for my 
use of this term here ultimately to Samer Ali, who tactfully retools the Habermasian 
notion of public sphere and applies it to the context of Medieval Islamic literary culture 




While some have taken Habermas’s theory to explain a unique European 
experience in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, my assumption in using it 
as a humanistic paradigm falls into line with Habermas’s own formulation that the 
public sphere is a kind or category of bourgeois society that can emerge and wane 
depending on favorable circumstances…. (“The Rise of the Abbasid Public 
Sphere” 469). 
 
Ali goes on to enumerate a handful of  “favorable circumstances” which fostered the 
emergence of a public sphere in the Abbasid Era, among the most important of which is 
the presence of a burgeoning literary culture which placed a high value upon the 
exchange and dissemination of humanistic knowledge (adab). This spread of humanistic 
knowledge took place most often via the medium of public gatherings, gatherings which 
Ali argues provided a space in which participants from many different walks of life could 
come together, debate one another, and ultimately seek to build consensus on important 
social and political issues of the day (475). Based on his discussion of adab, Ali comes to 
several important conclusions about the nature of the public sphere in the Abbasid period:  
 
Members of the Abbasid bourgeoisie are assembling, not only to influence and 
edify one another, but also to promote ideals that are of public benefit. 
Humanistic knowledge (adab) was the key to participating in a sphere of public 
concerns 
. . .  
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Knowledge and oratory held a formidable persuasive power in “forging” social 
ties, which implied a savvy understanding of the goals of social influence. With 
these new forms of influence, otherwise middling people could redress questions 
of public concern. [My Emphasis] (475, 476). 
 
    
I propose, then, that the public sphere of which Ali speaks is the very public 
sphere of which the discourse of the Ikhwān is a product, and the very public sphere to 
which The Epistles as adab contribute in return, imparting upon it the unique ideals of 
brotherhood and cooperation as a means to political consensus and problem-solving. This 
ideal of political and social cooperation though brotherhood in the public sphere develops 
even further in the following paragraph of The Epistles, taking on a spiritual aspect as 
well: 
 
أنه ينبغي لك أن تتيقن بأنك ال تقدر أن تنجو وحدك مما  –أيدك هللا وإيانا بروح منه  –و أعلم يا أخي    
ألنك محتاج في  –عليه السالم  –وقعت فيه من محنة هذه الدنيا وآفاتها بالجناية التي كانت من أبينا آدم 
نجاتك وتخلصك من هذه الدنيا التي هي عالم الكون والفساد، ومن عذاب جهنم وجوار الشياطين وجنود 
إبليس أجمعين والصعود إلى عالما ألفالك وسعة السماوات ومسكن العليين وجوار مالئكة الرحمن 
الدين علماء بحقائق األمور  المقربين، إلى معاونة إخوان لك نصحاء وأصدقاء لك فضالء متبصرين بأمر
ليعرفوك طرائق اآلخرة وكيفية الوصول إليها، والنجاة من الورطة التي وقعنا فيها كلنا بجناية أبينا آدم، عليه 
وكيف نجت من الشبكة لتعلم " كليلة ودمنة"فاعتبر بحديث الحمامة المطوقة المذكورة في كتاب . السالم
.حقيقة ما قبلنا  
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Know, O Brother – may God aid you and us with his mercy – that you must 
become certain of the fact that you cannot survive by yourself the challenges and 
ills of this world into which you have fallen due to the transgression of our father 
Adam – peace be upon him. For in order for your salvation from this world, 
which is the world of generation and corruption, and for your salvation from the 
pains of hell and the disciples of Satan so that you may rise to the cosmic 
heavens, home of the divine and the angelic – you are in need of the help of 
brothers. You need brothers who can be your friends and give you sound advice, 
brothers who are insightful about the issue of religion and who know the truth of 
things, so that they can show you the ways to paradise and how to get there. You 
need brothers who can show you how to survive the predicament which we have 
all fallen into through the transgression of our father Adam, peace be upon him. 
In order to realize the truth of what we have said, consider the Story of the 
Ringdove as told in Kalīla wa Dimna, and how the dove escaped from net. 
(Rasā’il  100; vol. 2). 
  
The Story of the Ringdove from Kalīla wa Dimna8 indeed does provide the perfect 
analogy for the kind of cooperation The Epistles envision. For this story tells the tale of 
several doves who become ensnared together in a hunter’s net, and how they manage to 
                                                          
     
8
.  Kalīla wa Dimna is a series of animal fables that originated in India and were 
translated into Arabic by Ibn al-Muqaffaʻ, a scholar who lived in Basra in the 8
th
 century. 
By the time of the Ikhwān some three hundred years later, these stories had become very 
popular throughout the Arabic speaking world, where they still remain very popular 




escape their predicament by cooperating with one another. After a few minutes of the 
doves’ doing nothing but panicking and fluttering helplessly about in the net, the 
ringdove emerges as the leader among them and tells them that they all must stop 
individually panicking and instead work together in order for all to escape safely. She 
then proposes that all of the doves fly in together in unison (naṭīr ka-ṭāʼir wāhid) while 
each holds onto a different part of the net with its beak. By doing this, the doves as a 
collective group achieve what they could never do individually: they manage to lift the 
net off the ground and fly it to the roof of a nearby building, where a rat who is a close 
friend of the ringdove lives. The rat helps his friend by chewing apart the net, freeing her 
and each of her fellow doves (Ibn al-Muqaffaʻ 235-38). 
 In the context of Ali’s public sphere thesis, then, the Ikhwān’s appeal to the story 
of the ringdove is a prime example of the use of adab for the purposes of political 
persuasion and religious alliance formation. For just as the doves banded together and 
cooperated with one another in order to free themselves from the net, so too must human 
beings band together and cooperate in order to free themselves from the material world 
and move toward a higher spiritual plane. For in the Ikhwān’s view, it seems to be the 
case that man cannot reach the paradise of the hereafter through living a life of isolation, 
wandering aimlessly in the world like the dove who flutters helplessly in the net. Rather, 
the Ikhwān appear to be suggesting that all of humankind collectively is on a journey 
toward the next world, the success of which requires both social and political cooperation 
in this world, the former guaranteed by the presence of a healthy public sphere in which 
ties of brotherhood across would-be social boundaries can take place.  
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In addition to engendering political, social, and spiritual notions of public good, 
the Ikhwān’s anonymity in The Epistles also seems to function rhetorically so as to 
imagine a religious orthodoxy that is non-sectarian in character, one in which many 
differing denominations and ideologies may constructively participate and contribute. In 
Epistle 45, for instance, the Ikhwān explicitly state a belief in the universal value of 
wisdom as such regardless of what sect or ideology it may have come from:  
 
وبالجملة ينبغي إلخواننا، أيدهم هللا تعالى، أن ال يعادوا علما من العلوم، أو يهجروا كتابا من الكتب، وال 
يتعصبوا على مذهب من المذاهب، ألن رأينا ومذهبنا يستغرق المذاهب كلها، ويجمع العلوم جميعها، وذلك 
ولها إلى آخرها، ظاهرها وباطنها، جليها أنه هو النظر في جميع الموجودات بأسرها الحسية والعقلية، ومن أ
وخفيها، بعين الحقيقة من حيث هي كلها من مبدأ واحد، وعلة واحدة، وعالم واحد، ونفس واحدة، محيطة 
. جواهرها المختلفة، وأجناسها المتباينة، وأنواعها المفننة، وجزئياتها المتغايرة  
 
All and all it is imperative that our brothers, may God support them, do not show 
hostility to any one madhhab, or reject the teachings of any one book, or become 
fanatical followers of any single school of thought. For our school of thought 
encompasses all of the madhāhib, and gathers together all branches of knowledge. 
This is because our madhhab involves inquiry into all existing things from the 
tangible to the intelligible, from the plain and evident to the esoteric and subtle. 
This insofar as all of the former things are from a single First Principle, or single 
First Cause, or a single soul which pervades the different substances, their 
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different kinds, and their constituent parts. [My translation with some consultation 
of Eric van Reijn’s translation]  (Rasā’il 41-42; vol. 4).         
 
To use Foucauldian language, the Ikhwān’s claim that their madhhab is supposed to 
incorporate all of the madhāhib is a particularly strong evidence for how the anonymous 
author name Ikhwān al-Ṣafā’ implies a space which may be occupied by a variety of 
different subjects who represent a diverse array of different religious schools of thought. 
Based upon this observation, the Ikhwān’s use of the verb istaghraqa in describing their 
madhhab here is particularly significant. For the verb istaghraqa whose root in Arabic 
means “to drown” bears a connotation of many things being “engulfed” by a greater thing 
or becoming dissolved into that thing. Upon reading this passage then, the reader is left 
with an image of the social and intellectual boundaries between the many madhāhib of 
10
th
 century Iraq melting and dissolving away so that the greater commonalities between 
these madhāhib  may become apparent. The anonymity of the Ikhwān, then, seems to 
serve as the catalyst within the text whereby this melding of many religious identities into 
one is able to take place. For the Ikhwān’s claim that their madhhab encompasses all of 
the madhāhib implies that the madhhab of the Ikhwān itself depends ontologically upon 
the diversity of madhāhib represented by the readership of The Epistles, and is therefore a 
claim that might be read as further evidence for how The Epistles construe their audience 
not as passive readers, but also active participants in the discourse of the text.  
A theme of non-sectarian religious orthodoxy grounded in ukhūwah sees further 




وأما الذي ذكرت بأن لكم أعيادا وجمعات وذهابا إلى بيوت العبادات وليس لنا شيء من ذلك، فأعلم أنكم لو 
كنتم مهذبي األخالق معاوني اإلخوان عند المضايق والشدائد، وكنتم كنفس واحدة في مصالح أموركم، لما 
جمع الناس بعد غيبتهم بعضهم وجب عليكم األعياد واجتماع الجمعات، ألن صاحب النواميس اقتضى هذا لت
إلى بعض، حتى يحصل من اجتماعهم الصداقة، إذ الصداقة أس األخوة، واألخوة أس المحبة، والمحبة أس 
فلهذا أمرت الشريعة . إصالح األمور، وإصالح األمور صالح البالد، وصالح البالد بقاء العالم وبقاء النسل
ع مخصوصة، وفي كل يوم خمس مرات في المساجد المحال أن يجتمع الخالئق في السنة مرتين إلى مواض
. والسوق ليحصل الغرض المطلوب  
 
And in regard to what you mentioned - that you have religious holidays and 
houses of worship to go to, we don’t have any of those things. So know that if you 
were disciplined in morals and helpful to your brothers in times of difficulty and 
hardship, and if you were as one soul in the carrying out of your affairs – that 
religious holidays and gatherings would not be necessary for you. This is because 
the maker of the laws contrived these religious practices so that people could 
gather after long absences from one another and so that friendship could result 
from their gatherings. For friendship is the basis of brotherhood, brotherhood is 
the basis of love, love is the basis of mutual compromise, and mutual compromise 
is the soundness of nations, which in turn is the survival of the world and the 
preservation of human kind. It is for this reason why sharīʻah has mandated that 
God’s children gather twice a year in specific locations, and five times a day in 
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their local mosques and marketplaces – so that the desired aim (of friendship) can 
occur. (Rasā’il 328; vol. 2). 
     
The Ikhwān, then, do not view the carrying out of religious duties as mere ends in 
themselves, but as means to a greater end: that of promoting the interests of the public 
sphere by appeal to the values of friendship and political cooperation. They seem to be 
suggesting, then, that God mandated prayer five times daily not as a mere spiritual ritual, 
but because He recognized that a community whose members gather together in a 
mosque to pray five times daily is likely to be a community whose bonds of friendship 
and brotherhood will remain healthy and strong, able to persist in the face of the 
adversities of this world that may otherwise lead to the likes of fitnah. Not only, then, do 
the Ikhwān endorse communal cooperation as necessary by appeal to the laws of human 
nature, but they also endorse it as necessary by appeal to divine law. 
 To recap, I have up until now examined and analyzed an array of textual evidence 
for the critical emphasis the Ikhwān placed upon cooperation and brotherhood as ideals 
for the betterment of their society. In doing so, I have argued that the Ikhwān’s appeal to 
brotherhood and community in The Epistles depends directly upon the anonymity of their 
identities. For based on the Foucauldian concept of the Author function , the very 
function of the author name “Ikhwān al-Ṣafā’” performs is to create a communal and 
open space of brotherhood into which the reader begins to enter just by virtue of his 
reading The Epistles. I have argued further that the Ikhwān’s notion of brotherhood as 
illustrated in The Epistles is not exclusive and sectarian, but one meant to apply to a 
45 
 
diverse range of individuals who hail from a variety of religious, political, and social 
backgrounds. 
Yet at this point the skeptical reader will surely ask the following types of 
questions: First, how do we know that the Ikhwān were not merely endorsing 
brotherhood for their own selfish reasons, placing their own well-being and salvation 
against that of those who did not share their intellectual outlook on life? Are the notions 
of friendship and community in The Epistles really based upon any consistent first 
principles at all? These questions can begin to be answered by taking a look at one final 
excerpt from The Epistles, this one from Epistle 45, entitled “The Nature of Friendship 
among the Ikhwān al-Ṣafā’” (Kayfīyat Muʻāsharat Ikhwān al-Ṣafā’ ). The Ikhwān write: 
 
تكون لسبب ما، فإذا انقطع ذلك السبب بطلت تلك الصداقة، إال صداقة إخوان الصفاء فإن صداقتهم قرابة كل صداقة 
رحم، ورحمهم أن يعيش بعضهم لبعض، ويرث بعضهم بعضا، وذلك أنهم يرون أنهم نفس واحد في أجساد متفرقة، 
....فكيفما تغيرت حال أجساد بحقيقتها، فالنفس ال تتغير وال تتبدل  
 
Every friendship is for one reason or another, and if the reason for the friendship 
ceases so too does the friendship itself cease. Yet the friendship of the Goodwill 
Brethren resembles the closeness of brothers in the same womb. They live for the 
sake of one another, and they pass on their belongings to one another. 9 This is 
                                                          
     
9
. The Ikhwān’s view of the friendship among one another as brothers here appears to 
strongly parallel  Aristotle’s notion of  the ideal kind of friendship, which he refers to in 
the “Nicomachean Ethics” as  “perfect friendship.” (145; bk. 8 pt. 1) Aristotle suggests, 
much like the Ikhwān do here, that those in perfect friendship base their friendship not 
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because they see themselves as a single soul in many bodies. So however the state 
of their bodies may change, the soul does not change.  [My translation with 
consultation of Eric van Reijn, p. 39.] (Rasā’il 48; vol. 4). 
On the view of the Ikhwān, then, is appears that friendship based upon brotherhood 
between human beings is distinguished from mere utilitarian friendship in that the former 
is closely related to the nature of the human soul. For the Ikhwān’s comparing the human 
soul to a womb which provides comfort and closeness for brothers perhaps suggests a 
belief that the human soul constitutes a core possession shared among otherwise different 
individuals, and thereby serves as a framework that might bring such individuals closer 
together into brotherhood. Contrary to what skeptical accusation may suggest, then, the 
Ikhwān’s notions of brotherhood, cooperation, and friendship seem firmly rooted in first 
principles. Actually, they seem to be rooted in a single first principle. Quite simply, the 
first principle of human cooperation for the Ikhwān appears to be none other than the 
human soul itself. As we shall see later, the Ikhwān actually devote a significant portion 
of The Epistles toward examining and explaining the nature of the human soul and,  more 
importantly, arguing that the human being’s sound knowledge of his own soul is a 
prerequisite for his healthy coexistence with his peers. The Ikhwān’s particular 
metaphysical view of the human soul and the practical normative implications that result 
from this view will be dealt with closely in the next chapter. 
Yet skeptical questions remain about the practical extent of the Ikhwān’s 
humanism. It is important to note here that the Ikhwān’s brand of humanism has its 
                                                                                                                                                                             
upon  pragmatic concerns of self-benefit and utility, but rather view friendship as an 
intrinsic good in and of itself (145; bk. 8 pt. 1)  
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limits. For the fact of the matter is that all forms of humanism have their limits, even our 
modern conceptions of humanism which tend to be celebrated as absolute. How inclusive 
in practice was this particular brotherhood the Ikhwān appear to be speaking of? Does the 
notion of ukhūwah grounded in anonymity leave room for the participation of women, or 
is ukhūwah  in The Epistles limited to a masculine understanding only? While there 
seems to be a role for a reasonable diversity of men in the brotherhood of the Ikhwān, 
there are hardly any indications in The Epistles as to whether, if at all, this brotherhood 
might be open to women. Moreover, the Ikhwān’s characterization of women and their 
spiritual and intellectual aptitude appears by today’s standards plainly offensive at best 
and misogynistic at worst. Write Ikhwān on women: 
 
.هن كثير، وأن استفسادهن سهل يسير، إال من عصمها هللا تعالى منهن، وقليل ما هنفقد أنبأناك أن تلون  
 
We have warned you that their [womens’] mercurialness is great, and that they are 
easily corrupted, except for those whom God has prevented from vice, and indeed 
these are few (Rasā’il 259; vol 4). 
 
The above description of women suggests that the Ikhwān saw them as somehow 
handicapped by a propensity for fickleness and deception, thereby far less likely than 
their male counterparts to ever achieve a degree of wisdom requisite for full-fledged 
participation in the brotherhood. Moreover, in some descriptions elsewhere in The 
Epistles, women are ranked as belonging to the same category as immature young men 
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and fools (al-ṣabyān wal-ḥamaqāʼ) in their intellectual ability (Rasā’il 349; vol. 2). 
Perhaps the Ikhwān adopted such a negative view of women from Aristotle, who claimed 
quite similarly that the women by nature are more impulsive and more prone to 
irrationality than men.10 So much, then, for The Epistles’ view of women. It seems clear 
that any women who might participate fully in the Ikhwān’s brotherhood were, at best, of 
a rare sort and very few in number. Although the Ikhwān’s concept of brotherhood bears 
a non-sectarian and irenic component that seems to have been relatively inclusive, then, 
this brotherhood was not without its serious limits. At the very least, it seems in practice 
to have been by no means equally open and inclusive toward the female population. 
In questioning the degree of openness of the brotherhood of the Ikhwān, we must 
also pose the question of who read The Epistles, and just how widespread they really 
were in Islamic society. If my argument that the Ikhwān’s anonymity as authors of The 
Epistles facilitated the proliferation of their ideas among a wider and more diverse range 
of individuals is to hold water, then we should expect that The Epistles enjoyed a 
relatively extensive degree of transmission and reception beyond the 10
th
 century. The 
best we can do to speculate on whether or not this actually was the case is to examine 
extant manuscript evidence. Baffioni, in the technical introduction to her work Epistles of 
the Brethren of Purity, points out that today a total of nineteen manuscripts of The 
Epistles exist in libraries of different parts of the world including Istanbul, Tehran, 
Madrid, Paris, and Oxford (xxii). Except for a few, she reports finding that most of these 
manuscripts are complete, some even fully vocalized (37-41). The oldest complete 
                                                          
      
10
.  For more information on Aristotle’s characterization of women, see: The History 
of Animals, bk. 9, pt. 1, par. 7 
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manuscript of the entire corpus of The Epistles is the ʻAṭif Efendi 1681 manuscript, 
which dates back to 1182 C.E, and is found in Istanbul (Baffioni 35-36).11 As to the 
question of whether The Epistles had a popular readership or whether they remained 
mostly the relatively underground concern of a scientific elite, we can ultimately only 
speculate. It appears, however, that some Epistles were more populist in their 
transmission and use than others. A particularly widespread Epistle seems to be Epistle 
22, “On Animals” (al-hayawānāt wa aṣnāfuhā), which is a fascinating extended dialogue 
which details the story of a debate taking place between the community of humans and 
kingdom of animals about the fundamental differences between the two. This Epistle 
seems to have made it far and wide, for it was translated into Hebrew in the early 14
th
 
century by Kaylonymus Ben Kalonymus12, A European Jewish scholar of Arabic thought 
who appears to have lived and worked mostly in Salonica (Cassuto 749).  
At the very least, then, we might conclude that the survival of The Epistles in 
various locations today via such a diversity of manuscripts, many intact and complete, 
suggests that the ideas of the Ikhwān saw a fair degree of circulation and reception 
throughout various parts of the Islamic world onward from the 10
th
 century, and that The 
Epistles were therefore were not as clandestine and secretive of a text as some scholars 
have tended to suggest. According to this line of argument, it seems that the anonymous 
Epistles have followed a trajectory of transmission and influence rather different from 
                                                          
     
11
 . Baffioni provides in fact a very detailed overview and explanation of the extant 
manuscripts, for this explanation see: Epistles of the Brethren of Purity 35-62.  
 
     
12
.  Kaylonymus entitled his Hebrew translation Iggeret Ba'alei Ḥayyim  or “The 
Epistle of Animals”. 
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that of the named Ismāʻīlī doctrinal sources written during the time of the Fatimid rule, 
for Paul Walker mentions that much of the latter sources exist today only in the sectarian 
libraries of the Tayyibī Ismāʻīlī’s (Exploring an Islamic Empire  9).  Based on all of the 
former evidence, then, it seems fair to conclude that the Ikhwān’s anonymous request in 
The Epistles that their readers pass the text on to other “brothers” was relatively impactful 
and effective. 
In conclusion to this chapter, suffice it to say that I have taken a literary approach 
to the anonymity of The Epistles, one which I think is ultimately more beneficial to 
analysis. Instead of considering anonymity as a historical question of personal identity 
independent of the content of the text produced, I have tried to consider the role of 
anonymity as a literary  function of the text itself. For this task I have benefitted greatly 
from the theoretical apparatus provided by Michel Foucault’s concept of the Author 
Function. In applying Foucault’s Author Function to the author name “Ikhwān as-Ṣafā” I 
have argued that this name plays a significant role in framing the discourse of The 
Epistles within the public sphere of 10
th
 century Islamic society. Moreover, I have argued 
that this name also plays an important role in defining the audience of The Epistles, as 
well as characterizing and idealizing the sort of social, political, and religious interaction 
which ought to take place among the diverse members of that audience. Insofar as 
anonymity means the absence of a reveled identity, then, I conclude that the Ikhwān’s 
anonymity is very much part and parcel of the textual message of The Epistles. For had 
the author name of the text been given simply as a person’s name or a list of individuals, 
then the Author Function of this name doubtfully would play as active a role as the 
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Author Function played by the name Ikhwān al-Ṣafā’. For it is unlikely that the Author 
Function of an individual’s name would be able permit the same creation of an 
amorphous, dynamic public space of brotherhood as is permitted by the Author Function 
of the name Ikhwān al-Safā. Moreover, it is likewise difficult to see how the presence of 
an individual name given for the authorship of The Epistles would have allowed the same 
breaking down of identity barriers between author and audience, which, as we have seen, 
is an important feature of both the discourse and content of The Epistles. Moreover, it 
seems from extant manuscript evidence that the anonymity of the Ikhwān bore an 
important role in broadening the reception and transmission of The Epistles.  
In sum, then, I have tried to argue in this chapter that reading the Ikhwān’s 
anonymity as a positive textual feature of The Epistles can lend great elucidative 
understanding to the social, political, and religious ideals voiced in the latter. In taking 
this new direction, I hope I have set a precedent which future scholarship of The Epistles 
of the Goodwill Brethren might follow. For when applied to the question of anonymity, 
the Foucauldian notion of authorship suggests that the anonymity of the author need not 
necessarily be construed as a “negative feature” which hinders our interpretation of a 
given text, but rather that author anonymity may sometimes be read as a “positive 
feature” which can actually enhance and further our hermeneutic understanding of the 
text. 





Humanism in The Epistles: The Health of the Soul and its Practical Implications for 
Tolerance and Goodwill 
The nature of the human soul forms one of the most apparent unifying themes of 
The Epistles. In numerous passages and in many different contexts, not only do the 
Ikhwān display an evident preoccupation with defining the human soul for their reader, 
but they also display an even greater preoccupation with imploring their reader to care 
about the state of his own soul. In other words, the Ikhwān appear very concerned that 
their reader seek to achieve a kind of “good health” for his soul. An especially revealing 
example of the importance the Ikhwān place upon the soul can be seen in the following 
excerpt from The Epistles: 
إحداها أنهم ال : وأعلم أن الجهاالت التي غشيتنا، المانعة من الصداقة وصفوة األخوة، هي أربع جهاالت
يعرفون ما الفرق بين النفس والجسد، والثانية أنهم ال يدركون كيف رباط النفس بالجسد، والثالثة أنهم ال 
فال جرم أن النفس ما لم ! يدرون كيف تنبعث النفس من الجسد يدرون لَم ربط بالجسد، والرابعة أنهم ال
.تنبعث من الجسد فال تعرف الفوز والنجاة والخلود في النعيم، مخلدة في الجحيم في عذاب أليم  
 
Know the kinds of unawareness that have deceived us, those hindering friendship, 
goodwill, and brotherhood, are of four types. One of them is that our brothers do 
not know the difference between the soul and the body. The second is that they do 
not know how the soul is connected to the body. The third is that they do not 
know why the soul is connected to the body, and the fourth is that they do not 
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know how the soul rises from the body [after death]! It is no accident that the soul 
which does not rise from the body will not know victory, salvation, and eternal 
bliss, but rather lives eternally in hell and in painful suffering. (Rasā’il 171; vol. 
4) 
Based on this passage, it appears that the Ikhwān’s concern for the soul formed a very 
important component of their overall vision of brotherhood and community. For this 
passage implies that the Ikhwān saw unawareness of the soul and its distinctness from the 
body to be among the most insidious of delusions which hamper friendship and goodwill 
in their society. Yet why do the Ikhwān consider the distinction between the soul and the 
body to be so important, and how is knowledge of this distinction supposed to lead to 
goodwill? Why, in the Ikhwān’s view, might a soul fail to rise from the body after death, 
and why is the soul’s departure from the body after death so critical to brotherhood in the 
practical sense?  
In analyzing the practical implications of the Ikhwān’s view of the soul, I will 
draw upon the work of psychiatrist and transpersonal psychologist Stanislav Grof. Grof 
describes in clear and lucid language a notion of spiritual self-exploration which, I will 
argue, nicely parallels the conception of the soul which is developed throughout The 
Epistles. In discussing the relationship between our bodily existence and our spiritual 
existence, Grof writes: 
When our identification with the body-ego is absolute and our belief in the 
material world as the only reality unshatterable, it is impossible to fully enjoy our 
participation in creation. The specters of personal insignificance, impermanence, 
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and death can completely overshadow the positive side of life and rob it of its 
zest. We also have to add to it our frustration associated with repeated futile 
attempts to realize our full divine potential within the constraints imposed on us 
by the limitations of our bodies and the material world. To find the solution to this 
dilemma, we have to turn within. (216) 
Grof raises several important universal issues here that will form the basis for my 
analysis of the discourse of The Epistles on the soul. First there is the problem of the 
specters of death and insignificance that perpetually loom over a person insofar as his 
body exists in a seemingly material and impermanent world. Moreover, there is ones 
need for “zest” in life, an inherent need for inner joy and fulfillment which often conflicts 
with the harsh realities of the superficial and fleeting material world. Since one cannot 
ultimately find this deeper zest by looking outward toward the material world, the 
solution is to be found by his “turning within” toward the soul so as to free himself from 
the painful over-identification with his physical body.  I propose that Grof’s notion of 
“turning within” as a solution to the problems of physical existence finds a close parallel 
in the Ikhwān’s injunction that the reader come to know and care for his own soul. In the 
same way that Grof holds that “turning within” is a solution to the painful problems of 
one’s existence in this material world, I argue that the Ikhwān saw the cultivation of the 
soul as critical to addressing the difficult problems which their own society faced, among 
the worst of which were rancor, violence, and religious fervor.  In taking the work of 
Grof on as a theoretical framework, then, I will argue in this chapter that a critical 
component of the Ikhwān’s greater irenic vision and their overall effort to reconcile 
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the sectarian differences which were abundant in their society is their effort to 
cultivate among their contemporaries an inner knowledge and awareness of the 
soul.   
 Just as Grof claims that a person’s egotistic attachment to his physical body is 
quite harmful to his greater spiritual fulfillment in life, so too do the Ikhwān appear to 
adopt a similar view. In Epistle 38, the Ikhwān write: 
بين النفس والجسد، تكون هّمته كلها وذلك أن كل إنسان ال يعرف نفسه، وال يعلم ذاته، وال يعلم ما الفرق 
مصروفة إلى إصالح أمر الجسد، ومرافق أمر البدن، من لّذة العيش، والتمتع بنعيم الدنيا، وتمني الخلود 
!فيها، مع نسيان أمر الَمعاد وحقيقة اآلخرة  
Every person who does not know his soul, and does not know his self, and does 
not know the difference between the soul and the body, will spend all of his effort 
trying to resolve the affairs of the body. He will be concerned with pleasurable 
living and enjoying the fruits of this world. He will desire immortality in this 
world, all the while forgetting the life to come and the truth of the hereafter (al-
ākhirah) !  (Rasā’il 289; vol. 3) 
This passage seems to give an initial answer for why the Ikhwān believed the soul may 
fail to rise from the body after death: that one’s soul does not rise from his body after 
death appears to be a direct result of the his being overly concerned with bodily desires. 
The Ikhwān seem to be suggesting, therefore, that Hell for a person is not so much a 
physical place as it is the painful state of existence that results from his own misguided 
actions. For Hell, or the failure of the soul rise to the heavens, comes about when a 
person’s bodily appetites cause him to aggressively seek self-preservation in a world 
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which is ultimately fleeting and impermanent. This latter observation appears to explain 
the Ikhwān’s earlier statement that unconsciousness of the soul is “the principle source of 
malice”. For if one is unaware about the existence of his soul, then he will desire 
immortality in this world. If he desires immortality in this world, then he will likely stop 
at nothing in order to defend his material well-being. The Ikhwān seem to be warning 
their reader, then, that he who becomes a mere slave to satisfying his physical desires will 
in turn become predisposed toward committing a litany of malicious acts toward others, 
acts by which he seeks to insure the survival of his body and his material comfort in this 
world at any cost. Given what we know about the tumultuous political atmosphere in 
which the Ikhwān lived, such acts of malice likely often included greed, theft, animosity, 
antagonism, provocation, political deception, and stoking violence.  
After painting this bleak picture of a person who only cares about his bodily 
desires, the Ikhwān go on to contrast this individual with a far more level-headed kind of 
individual: he who knows about his soul and uses this knowledge as a guide for his 
actions. The Ikhwān write: 
ا وإذا عرف اإلنسان نفسه وحقيقة جوهرها، صارت همته، في أكثر األحوال، في أمر النفس، وفكرته أكثره
في إصالح شأنها، وكيفية حالها، بعد الموت، واليقين بأمر المعاد، واالستعداد للرحلة من الدنيا، والتزود 
.للمعاد، والمسارعة في الخيرات، والتوبة وتجنب الشر والمنكر والمعاصي  
 
If the human being knows his soul and the truth of its essence, then his efforts, 
most of the time, will be directed toward the affairs of the soul. And most of his 
thought will be devoted to resolving the issues of the soul, and how the soul will 
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be after death. He will be certain of the return and will prepare his soul for leaving 
this world. He will rise quickly to virtuous deeds and repentance while steering 
clear of malice, vice, and rebelliousness. (Rasā’il 289; vol. 3) 
The Ikhwān seem to be strongly suggesting here, then, that a particular reason why 
knowledge and care for the soul is important is because this knowledge allows one to free 
himself from the malicious desires of the body that result from the fear of death. Unlike 
the first individual who finds reassurance only in his fleeting body, the individual who 
finds reassurance in the existence of his soul and its survival beyond this world would 
seem less likely to respond to the problems of this world with anger and aggression. For 
the Ikhwān seem to be suggesting that he who is overly attached to his body will not want 
to part with that body, and will thereby experience an anxiety of separation which can 
lead him to rash and desperate acts of malice in response to those individuals and 
circumstances which might place his physical body or material wealth in harm’s way. An 
awareness of the soul, on the other hand, will free a person from this separation anxiety. 
For a person who identifies more closely with his soul will be less anxious over the state 
of his body, and will thereby be more prepared to resist the destructive temptations that 
result from the body’s egotistical desire for self-preservation. The deeply rooted 
knowledge which this latter individual has of his soul, and his concern for its ultimate 
destination, then, will cause him to take the day-to-day calamities of physical life less 
seriously, making him less likely to respond to these calamities with outward displays of 
physical angst. Rather, for a person in touch with his soul, the primary response to 
physical adversity will take place internally. His attachment to his soul and his need to 
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cultivate its character will provide an inner refuge from the painful realities of the 
physical world, thereby making him better able to bear these realities in a manner which 
is not hostile and outwardly aggressive. A deeply rooted knowledge of the soul and a 
value for its cultivation, in other words, will  furnish the individual with a demeanor of 
patience and tolerance as he carries out his daily life. This proclivity for patience in turn 
will make him more likely to use restraint and prudence in dealing with those who are 
hostile toward him, instead of merely responding to such hostility with greater hostility.  
This concern to prevent an escalation of hostility in society in fact seems to be a 
very important aspect of the Ikhwān’s preoccupation with their reader’s knowledge of his 
soul. That this is the case seems to be further evident based upon the following, taken 
from Epistle 9, entitled “On Morals” (Bayān al-Akhlāq) in which the Ikhwān speak about 
the different moral qualities which are most harmful to the soul. Here, the Ikhwān 
characterize envy (al-ḥasad) as among the worst characteristics which can undermine the 
moral integrity of the soul and intern lead one to malice . The Ikhwān write: 
ومن أخوات الحسد وأشكاله الحقد والغل؛ والدغل؛ ثم تدعوهذه الخصال إلى المكاشفة بالعداوة، والبغضاء، 
الرحمة والفظاظة والغلظ، والطعن  والحرد، والتعدي والعدوان، وقساوة القلب وقلة والبغي، والغضب
.واللعن والفحشاء؛ وتكون سبباً للخصومة والشروالحرب والقتال  
 . . . 
....اإلخوان والبعد من . . . ويصير ذلك سبباً لتشتيت الشمل، وتفريق الجميع  
Among the sisters of envy are hatred and rancor, and spite. These qualities lead 
one to display enmity, loathing, oppression, anger, hostility, harshness of heart 
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and lack of mercy, rudeness and intimidation, slander and condemnation and 
indecency; these are the cause of antagonism and malice and war and killing 
. . . 
All this becomes a cause for the fragmentation of unity and divisions between 
everybody . . . and distance between brothers (Rasā’il 352; vol. 1).    
That the Ikhwān single out envy as the worst of moral traits seems to further imply that 
they viewed the aggressive attachment to the body at the expense of the soul as a primary 
source of strife in their society. For envy can only occur when somebody wants 
something he does not have but somebody else does. Since the soul is something that 
everybody, at least in theory, might have access to should he apply himself, then it is 
difficult to see how the soul might be the object of envy. Rather, the goods of the material 
world seem to be the primary stuff of envy. One can be envious of another person’s 
wealth, status, influence, or physical attractiveness, for example, yet it is less clear that 
somebody can be envious of another person’s “soul”. The Ikhwān might be suggesting, 
then, that the exclusive pursuit of material and worldly goods, will lead one to envy 
others who have a greater share of the former, and this envy thereby will result in the 
more visible and harmful acts of war and hostility. On the other hand, a person more 
closely tied to his soul will be less prone to envying other people’s material status, and 
thereby less likely to be tempted to the malicious deeds which are the sisters of envy. 
This litany of “sisters” of envy to which the Ikhwān refer are most informative in that 
they paint a detailed picture of the kind of society which results when people start to 
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become overly attached to their physical existence at the expense of a deeper knowledge 
of their souls. Like a contagious disease in society, envy perpetuates peoples’ aggressive 
identification with their bodily existence, resulting thereby in a cascade of malicious 
sentiments, which, if left unchecked by the greater awareness of the soul, will over time 
result in greater social disunity. Like a sibling rivalry that pushes the brothers of a 
household away from one another and diminishes their ability to cooperate productively 
with, the sisters of envy create entrenched divisions in society which heighten the 
possibility for mutual aggression while hindering the possibility for compromise and 
harmony. These sisters of envy, then, might be read as the Ikhwān’s interpretation of the 
notion of fitnah, the compelling physical temptation that leads one toward the 
participation in violence and war.   
That the Ikhwān viewed neglect of the soul as a primary source of hostility and 
ill-will in their society is evinced even further by the following passage, taken from 
Epistle 43. The Ikhwān write:   
ا واشمأزوا عن ذكرها، وينسبون وفي الناس طائفة إذا سمعوا مثل هذه المسائل نفرت نفوسهم منه
فأولئك أقوام قد استغرقت نفوسهم . المتكلم أو السائل عنها إلى الكفر والزندقة والتكلف لما ال ينبغي
  ...في نوم الجهالة
 
Among people there is a group that, if they heard about these kinds of issues 
[issues of the soul], would close themselves off to them and disdain their mention. 
They would accuse him who mentions these issues or ponders them of apostasy, 
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atheism, or over-concern with extraneous matters. Peoples of this kind are such 
that their souls have drowned in a sleep of unconsciousness. (Rasā’il 11; vol. 4) 
In this passage, the Ikhwān seem to be making a direct link between a denial of the soul 
and religious zealousness on the part of their contemporaries. For the Ikhwān tell us 
directly here that those who disdainfully call their peers heretics  or atheists are none 
other than those who have in actuality lost touch with their own souls.
13
 The language the 
Ikhwān use here to refer to unconsciousness of the soul as a “sleep” from which a person 
must awake re-occurs rather frequently throughout The Epistles. An especially recurrent 
phrase of this type, for instance, is the following one: 
.لعل نفسك تنتبه من نوم الغفلة ورقدة الجهالة  
May your soul be weary of the sleep of deception and the complacency of 
unconsciousness. (Rasā’il 103-04; vol. 1, 218; vol. 3, 185, 355; vol. 4). 
The sheer frequency with which this plea to the reader appears in the text, then, is yet 
further evidence that the Ikhwān viewed awareness of the soul as essential to mitigating 
hostility. Moreover, that the Ikhwān liken unawareness of the soul to sleep seems to 
reflect a relatively broad notion of kindness. For the referral to ones removal from the 
soul as a sleep comes across far more gently than if the Ikhwān were to refer to this 
detachment as the result of stupidity, ineptitude, or incompetence. Not only is the 
temptation of sleep a daily and common temptation to which many readers might be able 
to relate easily, but the idea that a person unaware of his soul is “asleep” appears to de-
                                                          
13
 In the 10
th
 century, both kufr (apostasy) and zandaqa (atheism) were highly 
aggressive terms used to harshly condemn as un-Islamic the beliefs of another. ( 
“Takfīr.”, par. 1; “Zindīḳ.” par. 1. ) In contemporary language we might refer to these 
terms as “fighting words”.  
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emphasize his guilt and instead emphasize his need for help in staying awake. For sleep, 
unlike, stupidity or incompetence, is a feature of human existence over which at times 
people have little control, and to which even the most steadfast or intelligent individuals 
may succumb. 
 Yet how is a person whose soul has fallen into this sleep of unconsciousness 
supposed to be awoken? What do the Ikhwān have to tell us about the way in which their 
followers ought to deal with such a person? At the least, we would like to expect that 
such a person ought not to be castigated, berated, or punished, for if this were true, then 
the Ikhwān would appear to be hypocrites. The Ikhwān’s answer to the question of how 
those who are unaware of their souls should be dealt with is in fact a very interesting one. 
Referring again to the group of people who call their peers atheists and heretics, the 
Ikhwān tell us that this group should be treated in the following manner: 
من التذكار له بآيات  ما يقدر عليه فينبغي للمذكر لهم أن يكون طبيباً رفيقا حسن أن يداويهم بأرفق
الكتب اإللهية وما في أيديهم من أخبار أنبيائهم، وما في أحكام شرائعهم من الحدود والرسوم 
...ذلك كله إشارات للنفس بتذكيرها ما قد غفلت عنه من أمر معادها واألمثلة، فإن  
So it is incumbent upon him who speaks to them to be a like a friendly doctor to 
them, who medicates them in the kindest way possible through mentioning the 
verses of the holy books and pointing to the words which they possess from their 
own prophets. He should draw also upon the rulings of their laws in order to find 
teachings and examples. For all of the former things are reminders for the soul of 
what it has neglected about the life to come.  (Rasā’il 11; vol. 4) 
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The Ikhwān’s suggestion that their followers draw upon the words of multiple prophets 
and holy books in seeking to heal the soul reflects a view that all of these sources of 
spiritual literature, though they may differ in origin, ultimately lead to the same place. 
This latter idea, then, is further evidence of the irenic nature of the Ikhwān’s 
understanding of the soul. Here, moreover, we see a very interesting parallel drawn 
between the Parable of the Doctor from chapter one and the concept of a healthy soul. 
For just as the doctor in the parable was kind and gentle in curing the physical illnesses of 
the townspeople, so too do the Ikhwān view it as their responsibility to be kind and gentle 
in trying to cure the “illnesses” of people’s souls. Just as an awareness of the soul will 
mitigate aggression, then, so too does it appear that aggression is not the solution 
whereby to bring about awareness of the soul.  
Additionally, the previous passage brings up a very significant question: Given 
that the notion of “psychological illness” is a relatively recent and modern phenomena, 
how can we explain the significance of the Ikhwān’s “medicalization” of the soul in a 
medieval context? Why do the Ikhwān refer to ones disconnectedness from the soul for 
their readers as a kind of spiritual illness requiring “medication” in the same way that a 
physical illness would? More importantly, how does this medicalization of the soul create 
a shift in responsibility and blame? To begin answering these questions, it will help us to 
examine the following passage, in which the Ikhwān explicitly spell out their analogy 








:فصل في مرض النفوس وعالجها  
 
 وعقاقير يداوىلمرض األجساد طبا يعالج به،  كما أنبها،  ثم اعلم أن لمرض النفوس عالجات وطباً تداوى
النفوس كتب و قوانين علمية لمرض  فهكذا أيضاً عالجاتها؛  الحكماء موصوف فيها كتب وضعتهابها، ولها 
  ....عالجات األمراض النفسية مذكور فيها األنبياء والحكماءبها  جاءت
 On the Illnesses of Souls and Their Treatments: 
 
Know that for the illness of souls there are treatments and remedies by which 
these souls are medicated, just as there are treatments and pills to medicate the 
illnesses of bodies. For physical illnesses, there are books which wise men have 
written describing their treatments. In the same way, there are for illnesses of the 
soul books and laws which the prophets and the wise men have brought 
describing the treatments of these illnesses (Rasā’il 11; vol. 3). 
Because we learn here that the medication for the soul is to be found in the books of the 
prophets, this passage does a great deal to further elucidate the way in which the Ikhwān 
viewed religion. While some in 10
th
 century Basra would have understood religion as a 
kind of “mandate” to be imposed upon the masses by force, the Ikhwān, on the other 
hand, seem to construe religion as a “remedy” to be administered with care and tolerance. 
The Ikhwān’s likening of religion to medication for the soul, then, is a particularly strong 
piece of evidence to suggest that they saw religious violence and hostility as having little 
practical value to the public good. For just as it would be useless for a doctor to get angry 
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at his ill patient or treat him violently, it would be equally useless for a person to become 
angry and violent toward somebody who has fallen out of touch with his soul. In the 
same way that a physically ill person must be dealt with in tenderly in order for him to 
recover, so too must the spiritually ill person be treated with care and patience in order 
that his soul be able to awake from the sleep of unconsciousness.  
The shift in responsibility and blame which results from the Ikhwān’s 
medicalization of the soul, then, appears to be a very significant shift indeed. For while 
many of their contemporaries would conclude that those who are ignorant of religion 
deserve harsh rebuke or even physical punishment for their ignorance, the Ikhwān, in 
likening those unknowledgeable about religion to the sick patients of a doctor, appear to 
be lessening them of the blame for their condition. For in medicalizing the affairs of the 
soul, the Ikhwān appear to be arguing ultimately that one cannot be castigated for what he 
does not know. The unaware of the soul are not construed as maleficent heretics, then, 
but they are instead construed as relatively blameless victims.   
In order to make the Ikhwān’s comparison between religion and medicine more 
concrete, we need to ask the following question: what specific teachings from the holy 
books do the Ikhwān believe to be particularly effective “medicine” for the soul? The 
Ikhwān in part answer this question in the following passage. Continuing their discussion 
of spiritual illness, the Ikhwān write: 
بسيرته  ته الحسنة، والسيروهو االقتداء بسنة الناموس، واجتناب المحارم واالنتهاء عن المناهي، واألخذ بسن
ولزوم طلب المعارف، والتخلُّق باألخالق الجميلة، ولزوم سنة الهدى على الطريقة الوسطى في  العادلة،
الدنيا والسعي باألعمال الصالحة في طلب نعيم اآلخرة،ومداواة النفوس المريضة،  طلب معيشة الحياة
66 
 
ابتذكيرها أمر مبدئها، وما قد نسيته من أمر معاده بضروب األمثال بالوعد والترغيب في جزيل الثواب  
.والمدح والثناء لمن تاب وأناب لعلهم يذكرون  
 
It [the treatment of spiritual illnesses] means: avoiding and ceasing the forbidden 
while imitating the divine law, and taking up its good example, and walking in its 
just path of moderation, and talking up the injunction to seek knowledge, and 
acting with exemplary morals. It means taking up the injunction to follow the 
middle way between seeking a livelihood in this world and aspiring to honest and 
peaceful actions in seeking the hereafter. It means medicating those souls which 
are ill, by reminding them of their fundamental origin, and what they have 
forgotten about the issue of their afterlife.  This shall be done by giving examples 
and by promising great reward and praise for those who repent and come back to 
God, so that they might remember. (Rasā’il 11; vol. 3). 
The medicines of the sick soul mentioned in this passage further suggest that the Ikhwān 
saw care for the soul as an important means toward mitigating aggression and hostility in 
their society. For we learn here that among the most important medicines for the soul is 
that of moderation. We learn that the healthy soul requires a life of balance that comes 
about when one “follows the middle way” (al-ṭarīqah al-wusṭá) between material 
comfort on the one hand and spiritual pursuits on the other. Just as a life of material 
decadence cannot bring about a healthy soul, then, so too it is the case that a life of utter 
asceticism cannot bring about a healthy soul either. The individual, in order live a healthy 
spiritual life and prepare his soul for the next world, must have a livelihood in this world 
whereby he can reasonably sustain his physical existence. This echoes the significance 
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the Ikhwān place upon social and political cooperation as prerequisites for spiritual 
salvation. For, as we saw in Chapter One, the Ikhwān appear to hold the view that the 
human being cannot achieve spiritual salvation by living in separation from his peers. 
Rather, he must seek this spiritual salvation through active participation in a community 
of peers who are likewise concerned with the same end, a task which will unlikely be 
well served by aggression. Finally, the suggestion that the maintenance of the healthy 
soul requires that one work actively to medicate the illnesses of other people’s souls is 
most informative. For this suggestion directly ties the Ikhwān’s view of the soul to the 
pay it forward approach discussed in chapter one, thereby suggesting a necessary 
connection between the health of the individual soul and the health of the community as a 
whole. Just as the doctor in the parable employed the pay it forward approach to cure the 
townspeople, so too do the Ikhwān confirm for us here that a brother of goodwill must 
seek to pay it forward in treating people’s spiritual illnesses, exemplifying for them the 
teachings of the religious books in a way that best accords with their understanding.  
That the Ikhwān place such importance upon teaching by example here is also 
quite significant to their conception of the soul as a means toward the prevention of 
hostility. For it further suggests that they were not so much concerned with a person’s 
intellectual and abstract knowledge of religious texts as they were with his ability to live 
practically in accord with this knowledge and achieve the tangible result of greater 
tolerance. It appears, in other words, that the Ikhwān viewed spiritual knowledge largely 
as a practical kind of wisdom with important implications for the preservation of 
peaceful coexistence in day-to-day life. The keen emphasis which the Ikhwān place 
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upon knowledge of the soul as a practical knowledge leading one away from hostile 
deeds can be seen especially in the way they define the pursuit of philosophy, al-
falsafah.  The Ikhwān define al-falsafah as follows: 
.طها معرفة حقائق الموجودات، بحسب الطاقة اإلنسانية، وآخرها القول والعمل ما يوافق العلمالفلسفة أولها محبة العلوم، وأوس  
 
The beginning of philosophy is the love of knowledge, the middle of it is the 
knowledge of existence according to the power of human faculties, and the end of 
philosophy is speaking and acting in accord with knowledge. (Rasā’il 48; vol. 1). 
 
This highly practical definition of philosophy, grounded first and foremost the tangible 
results of human action, suggests that the Ikhwān’s aim to better the soul ultimately 
bears a strong political component. In propagating knowledge of the soul and stressing 
the importance of its health, it seems the Ikhwān were ultimately concerned with the 
beneficial changes that this knowledge will bring about in the words and deeds or their 
contemporaries. This might be further evidence to suggest that vision of the soul that 
develops in The Epistles does not merely boil down to the singular salvation of the 
individual, but to the collective salvation of the community as a whole. Insofar as 
salvation for the soul seems tied to cooperation, this implies once again that the 
temptation toward aggression is among the worst character traits when it comes to the 
health of the soul. 
To further elucidate the political component of the Ikhwān’s vision of the soul, it 
will help us to return briefly to the work of Grof. In speaking of the relationship between 
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a spiritual “turning within” and contemporary political problems of our own world, Grof 
writes the following: 
In the last analysis, the current global crisis is of a psychospiritual nature. It is 
therefore hard to imagine that it could be resolved without a radical inner 
transformation of humanity and its rise to a higher level of emotional maturity and 
spiritual awareness. (220) 
Just as Grof holds that the current global crisis is ultimately of a psychospiritual nature, 
so too do the Ikhwān appear to hold that the roots of violence in their society are 
ultimately to be found in the individual’s ignorance about his own soul and its connection 
to the divine world beyond. In the same way that Grof’s emphasis upon human spiritual 
transformation is related to the betterment of the planet, I hold that the Ikhwān’s 
emphasis upon healing illnesses of the soul is directly related to their political vision for 
the betterment of their society. Moreover, I propose that Grof’s emphasis upon the 
importance of emotional maturity finds a close parallel in the Ikhwān’s emphasis upon 
moderation and temperance of physical desires. Just as Grof holds that emotional 
maturity comes about from one’s turning his attention inward toward spiritual matters, so 
too do the Ikhwān seem to hold that virtues such as tolerance, patience, and moderation 
must come about by one’s striving to know his soul and seeking to maintain the health of 
the latter. In the final interpretation, then, the Ikhwān’s aim of treating illnesses of the 
soul via a pay it forward method is very much a political aim via which they strove to 




To use contemporary language, this political aim of healing souls might be best 
described as a kind of “grassroots” movement by which the Ikhwān tried to educate the 
diverse classes of individuals in their society about the centrality and care of the soul. The 
grassroots nature of the Ikhwān’s movement to raise awareness of the soul among the 
different ranks of society can be seen particularly clearly in the often very simple and 
accessible language the Ikhwān employ when they speak of the soul. A particularly 
informative example of this simple and accessible language comes from the following 
passage, taken from Epistle 48, in which the Ikhwān use a series of concrete and practical 
analogies in order to directly aid the reader in realizing the difference between his own 
body and his own soul. The Ikhwān write: 
و أعلم أيها األخ أن اإلنسان الباحث عن أمر النفس، الطالب معرفة جوهرها، لو أنه أنصف عقله ورجع إلى 
 حكمه، وقبل قضاياه، وفكر في نفسه، وتأمل بتمييزه،
  . ..  
وأن هذا الجسد بالنسبة إليه ما هو إال كدار مبنية الستبان له أن مع هذا الجسد جوهرا آخر هو أشرف منه، 
فيها ساكن، أو كدكان فيه صانع، أو كسفينة فيها مالح، أو كدابة عليها راكب، أو كقميص ملبوس، أو كلوح 
.في يد صبي في المكتب، أو كمدينة فيها ملك  
Know, O Brother, that for the person who inquires into the issues of the soul and 
asks for knowledge of its essence, the following is true:  If he were to use his 
mind and accept its conclusions, thinking about himself and what makes him 
distinct 
. . . 
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then it would become clear to him that with this body is another essence, greater 
than it, and that this body relative to this greater essence is nothing except for like 
a house in which a person dwells, or a shop in which there is a merchant, or a ship 
with a captain, or a donkey upon which there is a rider, or a shirt on someone’s 
back, or like a writing tablet in the hand of a student, or like a city in which there 
is a king (Rasā’il 182; vol. 4). 
This passage is significant because it construes knowledge of the soul not as the exclusive 
intellectual property of any one sect of madhhab, but rather as common knowledge open 
to the ordinary person who takes the initiative to ponder the matter. The Ikhwān’s 
suggestion that the individual’s knowledge of his soul is plainly accessible to him via 
rational contemplation is therefore highly indicative of the idea that they valued 
independent inquiry into religious matters, while they shunned religious coercion and 
extremism as ultimately harmful to the public good. Moreover, the series of analogies at 
the end of this passage, likening the body to a mere “shell” for the soul, are particularly 
interesting. The content for these analogies collectively seems to reflect a goal of 
reaching and appealing to a wide range of the social classes and professions which made 
up 10
th
 century Abbasid society. For in comparing the body to “the house in which a 
person dwells”, the Ikhwān seem to be addressing the ordinary masses. In comparing the 
body to the shop of a merchant, they appear to addressing Iraq’s burgeoning mercantile 
class. In speaking of the body as a “writing tablet” in the hand of a student, the Ikhwān 
are perhaps addressing the learned class of nobles, men of letters, and their children. 
Finally, in likening the body to the city in which a king dwells, the Ikhwān appear to 
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directly address the ruling classes. This diversity of analogies, then, reflects the Ikhwān’s 
effort to make their vision of the soul practical, accessible, and achievable for members 
of the various social classes alike. Overall, therefore, this passage serves to re-emphasize 
the idea that the Ikhwān’s vision of the soul is closely related to their political goal of 
increasing cooperation and reducing strife among individuals of different social 
backgrounds. 
While I have up to now examined many of the practical implications of the 
Ikhwān’s view of the soul in this world, I have paid relatively less attention to the 
practical implications of their view of the soul in the afterlife. How do the Ikhwān depict 
the destination of the healthy soul in the afterlife, and how might this depiction encourage 
tolerance in this life? This question will be addressed by examining the following 
passage, in which the Ikhwān relate their view of the soul to the final Day of Judgment in 
Islamic theology:  yawm al-qiyāmah. The Ikhwān write: 
ما النفس، يعني الروح، فهي جوهرة سماوية، نورانية، حية، عالّمة فّعالة بالطبع، حساسة دّراكة ال تموت فأ
فأنفس المؤمنين، من أولياء هللا و عباده الصالحين، يُعرج . وال تفني، بل تبقى مؤبدة؛ إما ملتّذة وإما مئتلمة
هناك، فهي تسبح في فضاء من الروح، بها بعد الموت إلى ملكوت السموات، وفسحة األفالك، وتخلّى 
فإذا انتشرت أجسادها، ردت إليها، . وفسحة من النور، وروح وراحة إلى يوم القيامة، الكامة الكبرى
.لتحاسب وتجارى باإلحسان إحسانا، والسيئات غفرانا  
The soul – which means the spirit – is an essence which is cosmic, alive, and 
bright. It is naturally active, sensitive, and aware. It does not die or perish, but it 
exists for all eternity – be this existence one of pleasure or one of pain. Therefore 
the souls of believers – those loyal to God and His just children – are carried up 
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after death to the celestial kingdom and the realm of the stars. There they stay, 
swimming in a void of pure spirit, and an expansive field of light, in comfort until 
the day of resurrection - the Great Reckoning. At this time they are returned to 
their bodies so they can by rewarded for their virtues and be forgiven for their 
sins.  
(Rasā’il 290; vol. 3)  
In mentioning the ultimate rewards and forgiveness that God will provide to the just soul 
in the afterlife, as well as the pleasurable comfort this just soul will enjoy, the Ikhwān 
seem to be further stressing for their reader the importance that one prioritize the 
cultivation of his soul over the pleasures of his body. For the mention here of the eternal 
comfort and expansive field of light in which the just soul shall swim has the rhetorical 
effect of suggesting that any material comfort the temporal world may have to offer for 
the body is ultimately irrelevant in comparison to the bliss and freedom which the just 
soul shall enjoy in the afterlife. A similar observation might be made about the Ikhwān’s 
hinting at a belief that the soul, if judged by God to be unjust, might experience an 
eternity of pain. For this language might suggest that any pains a person may face in this 
bodily world are ultimately insignificant in comparison to the eternal pain which the 
unjust soul may face in the afterlife. The upshot of this idea seems to be that it is better 
for one to bear the pains of this world with inward patience than to respond to them with 
outward anger and hostility. For while the pains of this world in the end only harm the 
body, reactions of malice and aggression harm the integrity of the soul itself, and thereby 
make the latter susceptible to an eternity of far greater pain than the material body may 
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face. The Ikhwān’s dichotomous language of eternal pleasure or pain, then, might be read 
as stressing the importance of delayed gratification when it comes to the individual’s 
pursuit of his worldly desires. This delayed gratification will in turn lead to less 
aggression and greater tolerance. For an individual who primarily looks to the next life 
for eternal gratification will be less likely to seek temporary gratification in the material 
world, and therefore less likely to be a slave to desires that may tempt him toward 
aggression. To speak more concretely, this ethos of delayed gratification might mean the 
difference between one’s answering violence with greater violence and his answering that 
violence by tolerantly turning the other cheek, steering clear of the enticement for 
physical revenge. It could mean the difference between angrily imparting religious 
judgment on somebody else by accusing him of kufr on the one hand, and on the other 
hand waiting patiently for God Himself to make this judgment in the afterlife. This latter 
idea of withholding judgment appears to gain further support in the Ikhwān’s mention of 
the Great Reckoning (al-kāmah al-kubrá), for this phrase stresses the idea that it is God 
and not human who holds final judgment over the destination of the soul. The implied 
sense of delayed gratification that results from the Ikhwān’s characterization of the 
afterlife, then, seems to be accompanied by a parallel emphasis upon the importance of 
withholding judgment. This idea that human beings should withhold judging others 
appears to fall in line with the Ikhwān’s medicalization of the soul discussed earlier. For 
in the same way that it would not make sense for a doctor to blame and rebuke his patient 
for being sick, so too would someone’s imparting judgment on his peers do little to 
advance to pursuit of religion as a whole. Overall, then, the Ikhwān’s account of the 
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afterlife as a great reward for the just soul seems to reflect the idea that the human being, 
rather than behaving as a religious fanatic and judging the souls of others, would be much 
better suited to spend his time in this world by seeking to better his own soul, while 
gently and peacefully encouraging his peers to do the same. 
Just as the idea that religious knowledge leads the soul toward goodwill forms a 
common theme of The Epistles, so too does the inverse of this idea appear to be a 
common theme in the text. In other words, to the same degree that The Epistles construe 
religious knowledge as the cause of a goodwill in the soul, they likewise construe 
goodwill in the soul as the cause of religious knowledge. The construal of the goodwill-
soul as facilitative of religious knowledge is particularly evident in the following passage. 
The Ikhwān write: 
راكها صور الموجودات من المحسوسات والمعقوالت كمثل المرآة، فإن إن مثلها في إد. . .  النفس
قيقتهاالمرآة إذا كانت مستوية الشكل مجلوة الوجه، تتراءى فيها صور األشياء الجسمانية على ح  
. . . 
 فهكذا أيضا حال النفس، فإنها إذا كانت عالمة ولم تتراكم عليها الجهاالت، طاهرة الجوهر لم 
السيئة صافية الذات لم تتصدأ باألخالق الرديئة وكانت صحيحة الهمة لم تعوج باآلراء  تتدنس باألعمال
 الفاسدة، فإنها تتراءى في ذاتها صور األشياء الروحانية التي في عالمها، فتدركها النفس بحقائقها
The soul . . . in knowing the forms of all things from the tangible to the 
intelligible, is like a mirror. For if the mirror were evenly shaped and had a clear 
face, then it would reflect things in the material world according to their true 
form. 
. . . 
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The case of the soul is the exact same. For if the soul were conscientious, and free 
of towering ignorance - good of essence and devoid of malicious deeds and ill 
morals – true in purpose while unscathed by beliefs of discord, then it will reflect 
the forms of the divine which are in its world. Such a soul will know these things 
truthfully as they are. (Rasā’il 6; vol. 4) 
The Ikhwān’s suggestion that the preservation of the soul’s amity is like the act of 
polishing a mirror is not only another example of simple and concrete analogy employed 
to teach their readers about how to care for their own souls, but more importantly, this 
mirror analogy implies that the presence of discord and malice within the soul will 
prevent the reader from being able to know God for himself. For in making this analogy 
the Ikhwān seem to be suggesting something like the following idea: In the same way 
that blotches or blemishes on a mirror prevent it from properly reflecting physical 
images, so too does the absence of goodwill in the soul prevent the believer from 
knowing God truthfully. For just as a physical object cannot appear properly in a mirror 
which has been soiled or distorted, so to can the divine image of God not fully appear in 
the soul of a person who has become malicious or contentious toward his peers. The 
Ikhwān confirm this idea for us by completing the analogy of the mirror in the following 
manner: 
ا إذا كان النفس جاهلة غير صافية الجوهر، وقد تدنست باألعمال السيئة أو صدئت باألخالق موأ
الرديئة أو أعوجت باآلراء الفاسدة واستمرت على تلك الحال، بقيت محجوبة عن إدراك حقائق األشياء 
كال إنهم عن ربهم : "ن الوصول إلى هللا تعالى، ويفوتها نعيم اآلخرة كما قال هللا تعالىالروحانية، وعاجزة ع
"يومئذ لمحجوبون  
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But if the soul is unaware and in essence lacks goodwill, having been debased by 
malicious deeds or scathed by beliefs of discord  - all the while continuing to exist 
in such a state, then it will remain veiled from true knowledge of divine things, 
and incapable of reaching God – glory to him. The bliss of the hereafter passes 
this soul by, just as God - glory to him -  said: “No. They are on that day veiled 
from their Lord.” [Quran 83:15]   (Rasā’il 6; vol. 4) 
This latter passage, then, is particularly strong in confirming the idea that, just as 
religious knowledge leads the soul toward the virtues of goodwill, so too do the virtues of 
goodwill in turn lead the soul to greater religious knowledge. For the Ikhwān tell us here 
that the presence of goodwill and the absence of malice in the soul are necessary in order 
for the soul to achieve knowledge of the divine. Overall, then, this analogy of the mirror 
serves as even further evidence that the Ikhwān viewed the practice of religion as going 
hand-in-hand with tolerance and goodwill. For just as we learned earlier that religious 
knowledge is a medicine which brings about goodwill in the soul, so too do we learn here 
that goodwill of the soul is a virtue necessary for attaining religious knowledge: a divine 
knowledge of God and ultimately the means toward salvation. 
 In this chapter, I have argued that the Ikhwān’s emphasis upon the inner health of 
the soul constitutes their solution to the problems of aggression and hostility stemming 
from over-identification with material existence, problems in which they saw the primary 
roots of the prevalent sectarian tensions within their society. If considered in the context 
of the many ideological alternatives that were present in the intellectual space of 10
th
 
century Baṣra, then, I believe we can conclude that the Ikhwān’s humanistic view of the 
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soul ultimately fell toward the more inclusive and irenic side of the spectrum. For while 
some in 10
th
 century Basra were concerned with issues such as which particular madhhab 
a believer belonged to or which family or social class he came from, the Ikhwān saw such 
issues as ultimately peripheral to what it really means to seek God and the afterlife. The 
humanistic view of the soul which The Epistles put forth for the taking, then, can in many 
regards be seen as an effort on the part of the Ikhwān to shift public discourse in their 
society away from a focus upon the superficial differences between the madhāhib and 
toward a focus upon their far more important and far deeper similarities. For when it 
comes to the question of religion and spiritual practice, The Epistles in the final analysis 
seem less concerned with the what and more concerned with the how. That is to say that 
the ultimate concern of The Epistles is not so much the particular prophet or holy book 
upon which a believer may base his religious practice, but rather the degree to which this 
religious practice causes him to eschew violence, extremism, and malice while embracing 
ideals of patience, moderation, tolerance, and goodwill. Moreover, many of the passages 
covered in this chapter hint at the idea that the Ikhwān believed that the need for 
cultivation of the soul was at its core a common, perennial truth, a truth which the great 
monotheistic religions and the great philosophers alike have all arrived at independently, 
albeit in different times, places, and historical circumstances. The Ikhwān’s argument that 
their doctrine of the soul is a perennial truth, supported by centuries of human experience, 
in fact constitutes one of the more visible irenic themes of The Epistles. The way the 
Ikhwān go about arguing for the former belief will be the subject of the next chapter. 
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 In conclusion to this chapter, let us examine some final words from Grof which I 
think somewhat echo the Ikhwān’s irenic vision of the soul. In discussing the relationship 
between inward spiritual practice and the betterment of our world, Grof has the following 
words to say:  
It is essential to complement everyday practical activities with some form of 
systematic spiritual practice that provides essential access to the transcendental 
realms 
 . . . 
 The potential benefits of this approach to existence transcend the narrow 
interests of the individuals who practice it. This strategy applied on a sufficiently 
large scale could have important implications for human society and our future…. 
(218, 220)  
Grof goes on to refer to this widespread practical application of spirituality as “planetary 
healing” (220). I propose that Grof’s vision of planetary healing is quite similar to what 
the Ikhwān envisioned for their society in undertaking to spread awareness of the soul. 
Just as the ultimate aim Grof foresees for spiritual practice is a planetary healing, so too 
does it seem that the ultimate aim of the Ikhwān in medicating souls was not only to heal 
the individual, but also to heal their society. For the Ikhwān appear to view diseases of 
the soul not only as afflicting the individual, but ultimately afflicting society as a whole. 
We have seen that the worst of these spiritual illnesses included the likes of malice, 
rancor, and religious fervor – illnesses which the Ikhwān viewed as fanning the flames of 
the sectarianism of their time.  
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In conclusion, then, the Ikhwān’s preoccupation with the cultivation of the human 
soul over the course of The Epistles reflects not an esoteric, abstract, and theoretical 
fascination, but rather a concrete social and political effort to cool the polarizing 
hostilities they saw in their society, hostilities they believed to be the primary result of 
excessive attachment to the physical world. If we are to follow many previous scholars in 
referring to the Ikhwān as “philosophers”, then we must do so with the full realization 
that their interest in philosophy did not stop at the theoretical, but rather continued very 
far into the realms of the politically and socially practical. In seeking to heal the soul, the 
Ikhwān were really seeking to cure their society from the pernicious and contagious 




Pre-Islamic Wisdom in The Epistles:  
Evidence for The Ikhwān’s Cultivation of the Soul as a Perennial Truth 
 
Among the most noticeable features of The Epistles as a piece of Medieval 
Islamic literature is the manner in which the work incorporates wisdom from a variety of 
traditions that came prior to Islam. Yet despite the discernible role which pre-Islamic 
traditions appear to play in much of the discourse of The Epistles, this role has had little 
analytical treatment from scholarship. Although scholars make an interesting observation 
when they describe the diversity of knowledge in The Epistles as “encyclopedic” or 
“eclectic”, this description ultimately does little to shed light on the function which 
diversity of knowledge performs in framing the message and meaning of The Epistles as 
a piece of literature directed at a medieval Islamic audience. Moreover, some scholars 
have gone so far as to view the diversity of wisdom traditions in The Epistles as evidence 
that the Ikhwān were not Muslims. Recall, for instance, Ian Richard Netton’s suggestion 
that much of the knowledge strands in The Epistles are “alien” to Islam and thereby 
indicative of the idea that the Ikhwān were “reluctant Muslims” (107).  
The conclusion that the presence of pre-Islamic knowledge strands in The Epistles 
serves to deny that the Ikhwān were Muslims, however, is not only unfruitful to analysis 
of the text, but is also somewhat presentist. This conclusion is presentist because it seems 
in part to be overly informed by today’s prevailing standards of truth, standards of truth 
which differ in important ways from those by which a medieval Islamic audience would 
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have likely received a text like The Epistles. By “standards of truth” I mean those 
standards by which something is understood to be true of false – confirmed or denied -  
for a given audience. In comparing modernist standards of truth to those prevalent in the 
Islamic middle ages, one of the most important differences has to do with the apparent 
role played by diversity and variation. As far as modernist standards are concerned, 
diversity and variation in accounts are often viewed to be in conflict with the idea of “one 
truth”. When it comes to the issue of religion, for example, many modern audiences have 
a tendency to construe the differences between the Judaism, Christianity, and Islam in 
their respective accounts of God as evidence for the view either that only one of these 
religions can be the “right” one, or that all must be wrong and that in actuality no one 
God exists. In other words, there exists a prevailing tendency in modern discourse, 
perhaps related to the rise of empirical science, to view truth as necessitating absolute 
unity and absolute consistency in account. Any variation in account or observation is 
thereby taken either as evidence against a given truth, or evidence that simply no truth 
exists at all. A tendency somewhat like this one seems to be informing Netton’s skeptical 
claims about the Ikhwān’s Muslim identity. For in suggesting that the Ikhwān were 
reluctant Muslims because pre-Islamic knowledge traditions are “alien” to Islam, Netton 
seems to be implying that the presence of these diverse traditions in The Epistles serves 
to deny the possibility that the text sends any kind of consistent and unified Islamic 
message. 
Yet the relationship between variation on the one hand and truth and unity on the 
other hand was understood quite differently according to medieval Islamic standards of 
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knowledge. While the contemporary tendency is often to view variation as debunking 
truth, in the Islamic Middle Ages variation  was actually understood to a large degree as 
crediting truth. This latter understanding can be seen most readily in the medieval legal 
concept of tawātur, an Arabic term translating approximately to “corroboration through 
recurrence”.
14
 Embedded in the notion of tawātur is the idea that historical diversity and 
multiplicity of accounts about one event or concept serve to strengthen the veracity of the 
later.
15
 The notion of tawātur is thereby a concept of truth formation that recognizes 
diversity while at the same time recognizing underlying unity and commonality.  
Given the importance of tawātur in the medieval Islamic context, then, it will be 
most fruitful to our reading of The Epistles to employ a framework of analysis that 
recognizes the interplay between diversity and unity in the formation and perpetuation of 
truth. M.M. Bakhtin’s dialogic criticism provides just such a framework. In his essay 
“Discourse in the Novel”, Bakhtin characterizes all literary discourse as shaped by two 
dynamic kinds of forces: “centripetal” and “centrifugal” forces. While centripetal forces 
are reflective of an absolute and abstract language of unity, centrifugal forces  are found 
in the divergent historical and social circumstances in which the language of unity is 
uniquely experienced and concretely played out in daily life. Bakhtin writes: 
The centripetal forces of the life of language, embodied in a “unitary language”, 
operate in the midst of heteroglossia. At any given moment in its evolution, 
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 . I have based this translation off of Chase Robinsons discussion of tawātur in his 
book Islamic Historiography. See: Robinson 87. 
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language is stratified into languages that are socio-ideological: languages of social 
groups… languages of generations and so forth…. Every utterance participates in 
the “unitary language” (in its centripetal forces and tendencies), and at the same 
time partakes of social and historical heteroglossia (the centrifugal, stratifying 
forces). (271-72) 
The central upshot of Bakhtin’s observations appears to be that notions of unity in 
literature cannot be analyzed independently of  notions of diversity. For insofar as literary 
discourse partakes in an idealized “unitary language” while at the same time partaking in 
the distinct voices of different social groups, ideologies, and historical periods, this 
means that unity and diversity in literature form a mutually interdependent and perpetual 
dialectic. According to Bakhtin’s framework, then, unity and diversity are not 
contradictory properties, but rather interrelated realities of language. As human language 
perpetually evolves, unity embeds itself in diversity, while diversity in turn feeds back 
toward unity. In Applying Bakhtin’s dialogic criticism to the Ikhwān’s prioritization of 
the soul as developed in The Epistles, I argue that this view of the soul is a unitary 
language which at once reflects a diversity of historical voices. In The Epistles, these 
historical voices are not only those of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam but also those of 
the philosophers of Ancient Greece. Based upon Bakhtin’s dialogic criticism, then, I will 
argue in this chapter that the view of spiritual truth put forth in The Epistles is a 
perennial truth, which, reflecting an irenic aim on the part of the Ikhwān to promote 
greater religious harmony in their own society, envisions a fundamental unity 
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between Islam and its spiritual predecessors while at the same time honoring the 
historical and social differences which underlie that unity. 
In numerous places in The Epistles, the Ikhwān argue for a common unity in 
purpose shared between Islam and the prior religious traditions. A particularly 
informative example of the unitary language the Ikhwān employ in describing 
commonality between the religions can be seen in the following passage. The Ikhwān 
write: 
وجدت أن غرضهم كلها مما شرعوه هو   . . . وأعلم يا أخي أنك إذا تأملت سير األنبياء ووصاياهم
  ...تأديب النفوس اإلنسانية
Know, O Brother, that if you contemplated the doings of the prophets and their 
advice, . . . you will find that the purpose behind all of the laws they decreed is the 
cultivation of human souls… (Rasā’il 118; vol. 4) 
In Bakhtinian terms, then, the notion of the betterment of the human soul forms 
the core of the unitary language present in The Epistles – this notion is a centripetal force 
which draws together and unites the different religions under a common fundamental 
end. Yet just as there exists this unitary language in The Epistles, so too must this unitary 
language be subject to the centrifugal forces of social and historical heteroglossia – this 
which lies in the different historical and social circumstances in which each of the 
prophets and his followers found themselves. These differences are not only differences 
of time, but of place. They are not only differences of language, but of culture. Much of 
the discourse in The Epistles appears to acknowledge the presence of important 
centrifugal forces  which underlie the common unity of religions. A particularly 
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interesting passage, for example, is the following, in which the Ikhwān attempt to explain 
to their reader the reason why the rulings and laws of the prophets have varied over time. 
The Ikhwān write: 
وأما اختالفهم في الطرق المؤدية إليها فمن أجل الطبائع المختلفة واألغراض المتغايرة التي 
عرضت للنفوس، وبذلك اختلفت موضوعات النواميس، وسنن الديانات، مفروضات الشرائع، كما 
مراض العارضة لجأجساداختلفت عقاقير األطباء وعالجاتها، وبحسب اختالف األ  
. . . 
.وبحسب اختالف األزمنة واألمكنة   
But their [the religions of the prophets] difference in their approach to this [the 
betterment of human souls] is due to the differing and varying circumstances 
which souls have experienced, and based on this the subjects of religious laws 
have differed – just as the pills of doctors and their treatments have differed based 
upon the different illnesses which bodies undergo.  
. . .  
[This] is based upon a difference of times and places. (Rasā’il 30; vol. 3) 
 
While the Ikhwān advocate for a common unity between the religions, then, they 
also appear to recognize that the religions bear important differences which deserve 
recognition and explication in their own right. The Ikhwān make their point by once 
again drawing upon the analogy of the doctor, which seems to their reader something like 
the following syllogism: 
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1. Just as the common purpose of doctors is to heal bodies, so too is the common 
purpose of the prophets and their religions to heal souls. 
2. However, just as doctors differ in their methods of treatment based upon 
difference in the nature of the illness treated, so too have the prophets differed in their 
approach to healing souls based upon the different historical and social circumstances in 
which those souls existed.  
 
These statements, I propose, form the key to the interplay between centripetal and 
centrifugal forces as concerns the recurrent theme of human salvation in The Epistles. 
These two statements are therefore my best attempt to illustrate the way in which The 
Epistles frame the language of the soul as a unitary language, while at the same time 
making room for and acknowledging the concrete heteroglossia to which this concept of 
unity has been continually subject as it has played out in the different religious traditions. 
For statements 1 and 2 do not directly contradict each other, but on close examination 
appear to mutually reinforce one another. Diversity of approach does not deny the 
existence of a common unitary purpose, but rather feeds back toward the practical 
accomplishment and furtherance of the former. In the same way that statement 1 and 
statement 2 do not directly contradict one another, then, so too does the presence of a 
notion of unity not rule out the possibility of diversity and variance. When it comes to 
religion, then, diversity and variance of approach do not undermine unity, but they rather 
reinforce and ultimately strengthen unity. This latter idea is the core of tawātur.  
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This mutual interplay between diversity and unity in the discourse of the Ikhwān 
on the human soul can be most readily seen in Epistle 44, which I will analyze through 
the remainder of this chapter. The particular section of Epistle 44 with which I will be 
concerned is entitled: “Those Who Devoted Themselves to Ignoring the Issue of Bodies” 
(Faṣl Bunnāʼ Amrihim ʻalā al-Tahāwun bi-ʼAmr al-ʼAjsād). In this section, the Ikhwān 
give a linear account of the lives of each of the three major prophets and some of the 
Greek philosophers, explaining how the life of each represents the unitary theme of 
turning away from the affairs of the body so as to better the soul. In this account, the 
Ikhwān argue that each prophet and philosopher in his own way believed in the eternal 
existence of the human soul, while each was likewise concerned with the common goal 
of raising human consciousness toward the importance of the soul and its existence 
beyond this world. In analyzing this section of Epistle 44, I will first give a general 
overview and commentary on each of the individual stories the Ikhwān tell about the 
respective prophets and philosophers. I will then conclude this chapter by raising some 
critical questions that might be posed about this section as a unified whole.  
The Ikhwān begin by speaking of Moses. They write: 
 تلف بعد حالها وصالح النفوس بقاء ويعقدون يرون عليهم، هللا صلوات األنبياء، ذلك أن على يدل ومما
 قال السالم، عليه موسى، أن . . . السالم عليهم من األنبياء، وغيرهما وعيسى موسى فعل ما األجساد،
 بالسيف، األجساد هذه يعني". بارئكم عند لكم خير ذلكم أنفسكم فاقتلوا بارئكم إلى توبوا:" وإلخوانه ألصحابه




Among the evidence that points to the fact that the prophets, may God bless them, 
recognize and believe in the survival of the soul and the betterment of its state 
after the perishing of the body are the things that Moses, Jesus, and the other 
prophets did, peace be upon them . . . Moses, for instance, said to his companions 
and brothers: “Repent to your Lord and kill yourselves. This is best for you in 
front of your Lord” [Quran 2:54] – he meant kill these bodies with the sword, for 
the essence of the soul is such that steel cannot harm it (Rasā’il 26; vol. 4) 
The Quran verse the Ikhwān cite here is uttered by Moses upon his return from the mount 
when he finds that some of his people have disobeyed his commandments and taken to 
worshipping the calf al-ʻajal  (Rasā’il  26; vol. 4). In speaking of killing the body with a 
sword, The Ikhwān seem at first glance to be taking a quite literal interpretation of 
Moses’ command in the Quran that the calf worshipers kill themselves (uqtulū 
anfusakum). Yet it is somewhat bizarre to assume that Moses’ only solution for the 
Israelites’ disobedience was to order them to literally take their own lives. However, 
based upon the general theme of repentance in Quran 2:54, Quran scholar Muhammad 
Asad has suggested that a more reasonable translation of uqtulū anfusakum is not the 
literal “kill yourselves”, but the symbolic meaning of “mortify yourselves” (Asad 10; 
ch.2 note 45). Based on this translation, I hold that Moses’ command uqtulū anfusakum is 
best understood as a plea to the Israelites for self-denial of the body. This translation also 
seems to make sense in the context of The Epistles’ subsequent description of Moses and 
the Israelites. For the Ikhwān continue their description of Moses’ prophecy by 
discussing a series of acts Moses tells the Israelites to perform in seeking to repent to God 
90 
 
for their idol worship. Among the repentant acts Moses commands is for his followers to 
“dress themselves in shrouds” (ilbisū al-akfān) and to “go to the place of prayer” 
(ukhrujū ilā al-muṣallá), which is strongly suggestive of a denial of the physical body in 
order that one my focus on the soul. The Ikhwān go on to clarify that an aim like this one 
was indeed the subject of the repentant acts Moses commanded for the Israelites. Ending 
their account of the calf, The Ikhwān write:  
ففعلوا ذلك طوعا وكرها، فأما الطائع فهو الذي علم أن في تلف جسده صالحا لنفسه وخيرا لها، وأم الكاره 
.فهو الذي جهل ذلك وعميت عليه األنباء  
 
So they [the Israelites] did those things – some doing them obediently, and some 
doing them resentfully. The obedient was he who knew that in the perishing of his 
body is the betterment of the soul and its wellbeing, whereas the resentful was he 
who was ignorant of this fact, blind to the prophets (Rasā’il 26-27; vol. 4).     
That the Ikhwān viewed the distinction between body and soul as a central aim of Moses’ 
religion becomes further evident by examining the following passage, in which they 
discuss the Pharaoh and his failure to recognize said distinction: 
أمنتم له قبل أن آذن : "وس تلك السحرة بتلف أجسادهم قتال أو صلبا، إذا قال لهم فرعونوكذلك رضين نف
لن نؤثرك على ما جاءنا من البينات والذي فطرنا فاقض ما أنت قاض إنما تقضي هذه الحياة "فقالوا " لكم
ولم يهابوه، وسمحت فصلبهم كلهم، " الدنيا، إنا آنا بربنا ليغفر لنا خطايانا وما أكرهتنا عليه من السحر
نفوسهم بتلف أجسادهم، لما علمت أن في ذلك حياة لها وفوزا ونجاة، ونصرة للدين، وصالح اإلخوان، 





Likewise the souls those sorcerers [of the Pharaoh] benefited by the destruction of 
their bodies through killing or crucifixion. For when the Pharaoh said to them: 
”How have you believed [in the God of Moses] before I have given you my 
permission!?” they replied: “We won’t be persuaded by your word of the 
statements that have come to us [from our God] and which we have come to 
realize in our hearts. So decree what you will decree, for your power is limited to 
this world and this life only, but our time is with our Lord, may he forgive us for 
our trespasses and for the magic to which you have compelled us.” [Quran 20:71-
73 and 26:49-51] At this, the Pharaoh crucified all of the sorcerers. They did not 
suffer, and their souls allowed their bodies to perish once they realized that in the 
perishing of the body there is for the soul life, redemption, victory, and triumph 
for religion, the betterment brothers, obedience to Moses and goodness for the 
Lord.  (Rasā’il 26-27; vol. 4) 
 
 The Quran verses upon which the Ikhwān draw in here tell the story of how some of the 
Pharaoh’s sorcerers, after interacting with some of the Hebrews enslaved in Egypt, are 
persuaded to take up the religion of Moses and to rescind their allegiance to their corrupt 
ruler. Angered that the sorcerers have disobeyed his authority by not even asking his 
permission to believe in the religion of Moses, the Pharaoh decrees that their bodies be 
mutilated and crucified.
16
 The words with which the sorcerers respond to the Pharaoh’s 
threat reflect their newfound grasp of the distinction between body and soul. For having 
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realized that their souls will ultimately depart their bodies and move into the divine world 
of God their true Lord, the sorcerers no longer fear the power of the Pharaoh which, in 
the final analysis, extends only to the temporal world of bodies. The Ikhwān’s final 
comment that the sorcerers saw in the surrender of their bodies “the betterment of 
brothers” (ṣalāḥ al-ikhwān) is particularly interesting, for this comment suggests that the 
Ikhwān saw in the religion of Moses a paradigm of brotherhood very much parallel to 
their own paradigm of brotherhood, based upon cooperation and social altruism.  
This parallel which the Ikhwān seem to be drawing between their own model of 
brotherhood and the model upon which prior religions were built becomes even clearer 
once we examine The Epistles’ characterization of the Christian religion and the goals of 
Christ as a prophet. Introducing Christ as the second great prophet after Moses, the 
Ikhwān write: 
 
األنبياء، عليهم السالم، يرون ويعتقدون بقاء النفس وصالحها بعد مفارقة الجسد، فعل  ومما يدل على أن
.المسيح، عليه السالم، بناسوته، ووصيته للحواريين بمثل ذلك  
 
Among the evidence that points to the fact that the prophets - peace be upon them 
- realize and believe in the permanence of the soul and its betterment after it 
leaves the body, are the actions of Christ – peace be upon him – such as his advice 
and guidance to the disciples, and the like. (Rasā’il 29; vol. 4) 
 
The Ikhwān go on to describe the purpose of Christ’s prophecy as necessary to remind 
the Israelites of what they have ultimately forgotten about the teachings of Moses. They 
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describe Christ as finding a nation of people who have neglected the teachings of Moses 
and who have become overly concerned with their bodily and worldly pursuits. The 
Ikhwān tell us that Christ found the Israelites “holding superficially to the religion of 
Moses” (muntaḥilīn dīn Mūsā), “reading the Torah but not rising to its mandates” 
(yaqra’ūn al-tawrāh ghayr qāʼimīn bi-wājibihā) (Rasā’il 30; vol. 4).  
In characterizing Christ’s response to this situation, the Ikhwān draw a direct 
analogy between the story of Christ and the Parable of the Doctor that I discussed earlier 
in Chapter One (29-30). Just as the accomplishment of the doctor in the parable was to 
heal the bodies of the townspeople by adopting a pay it forward approach, so too do the 
Ikhwān argue that Christ’s accomplishment as a prophet was to heal the souls of his 
contemporaries by likewise adopting the pay it forward approach. Of Christ’s relationship 
with the Israelites, the Ikhwān write: 
 
 
يلقى واحداً يعظه ويذكره لهم بزي الطبيب المداوي، وجعل يطوف في محال بني إسرائيل  فرأى أن يظهر
الجهالة، ويزهده في الدنيا، ويرغبه في اآلخرة ونعيمها ويضرب له األمثال، ويبهه من  
  
So Christ saw it best to appear to them like the doctor who cures the sick. He 
began to circulate in the land of the Israelites. He would meet one and then preach 
to him, remind him, and give him examples. He would warn this person of 
ignorance, cause him to eschew this world, and turn his desires toward the 




The Ikhwān go on to give an account of Christ’s encounter during his travels with a 
nation of people called al-Qaṣṣāriyyīn, literally, “the people who don white robes” 
(Rasā’il 30; vol. 4). Speaking in parable, Christ asks the people if it would make sense 
for them to wear their clean, white robes upon their bodies if their bodies were soiled 
with dirt and filth. Responding in bewilderment to the apparent pointlessness of the 
question, the Qaṣṣāriyyīn tell Christ that the answer is of course “no”, and that anybody 
who does this is a fool (wa man faʻla dhālika kāna safīhan). Christ then responds in irony 
by telling the Qaṣṣāriyyīn that they themselves have done this (faʻaltumūhā antum). 
When the Qaṣṣāriyyīn respond again by asking how this is possible, Christ explains that 
they have become overly preoccupied with the appearance and comfort of their bodies 
while their souls have become soiled by the likes of  ill-will (sū’ al-ẓann), and that 
somebody who allows this to happen is by analogy just like somebody who would 
foolishly don clean clothing upon a soiled and unclean body. Somewhat miffed by 
Christ’s observations about their way of life, the Qaṣṣāriyyīn respond by asking him what 
else they are supposed to do but to try and secure their livelihood (hal lanā budd min 
ṭalab al-maʻāsh?) (Rasā’il 30; vol. 4).  
The Ikhwān report that Christ responds to this existential question in the 
following manner:     
 
حيث ال موت، وال هرم، وال وجع، وال سقم، وال جوع، وال فهل لكم أن ترغبوا في ملكوت السماء : قال
وال حزن، وال فقر وال حاجة، وال تعب وال عناء، وال غم، وال حسد بين أهلها، وال  عطش، وال خوف،
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الريحان، ونعمة  سرر مقابلين فرحين مسرورين، في روح بغض، وال تفاخر وال خيالء، بل إخوان على
.…ورضوان، وبهجة ونزهة  
 
Christ said: Wouldn’t you like to seek after the Kingdom of Heaven where there 
is no death, no anger, no pain, no despair, no hunger, no thirst, no fear, no 
sadness, no poverty nor want, no tiring nor trouble, no grief, no envy among its 
people, no unpleasantness, no pride nor vanity? Rather this kingdom is a place 
where there are joyful and delighted brothers on thrones sitting beside one another 
in the mercy of the divine, in the delight of goodness, in joy and pleasure.... 
(Rasā’il 30; vol. 4). 
 
In style and in lexicon, the Arabic language of the above passage is very biblical in 
nature, and the Ikhwān appear to be borrowing the language of the Arabic bible (Ar.  al-
Kitāb al-Muqaddas) which would likely have been extant in the 10
th
 century Christian 
community of Iraq.
17
 A particularly close relationship in theme and in language can be 
seen when we compare the above Arabic passage to verse 4 of Rev. 21 from the Arabic 
bible. Speaking of God’s promise in the Kingdom of Heaven, Rev. 21:4 reads: 
م و الموت ال يكون فيما بعد و ال يكون حزن و ال صراخ و ال وجع فيما و سيمسح هللا كل دمعة من عيونه
.بعد الن االمور االولى قد مضت  
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. The oldest full manuscript of the bible in Arabic dates from 867 C.E. It is called the 
Mt. Sinai Codex 151. See: Griffith 131-132.   
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God will wipe away the tears from their eyes. There will be no more death. There 
will not be sadness, nor crying, nor pain anymore, because the old way of things 
has passed. (al-Kitāb al-Muqaddas Rev. 21:4). 
 
Grammatically and stylistically, the most important commonality between Rev 21:4 and 
Christ’s dialogue in The Epistles can be seen in the common use of the Arabic structure 
negation particle lā.  A particularly significant use of lā which appears in both texts is of 
the type called lā nāfiyah lil-jins, which, translating roughly to “negator of the entire 
kind”, is the strongest form of negation in Arabic. Hence the most literal understanding of 
a phrase like lā wajaʻ, which occurs in both texts, would not be simply “no pain” but 
rather something like:  “categorically no pain whatsoever”, or “the complete non-
existence of pain”.  
Using Christ as a historical voice, the Ikhwān appear to creatively employ and 
expand upon this biblical language in promising the pious soul a far better existence in 
the afterlife than it enjoys in this world of the body. Not only is the Kingdom of Heaven a 
place where there is absolutely no pain and sadness (ḥuzn), but also a place completely 
devoid of  sentiments like envy (ḥasad) and vanity (khīlā’), the harsh desires and 
emotions which the Ikhwān see as leading to violence and discord in this world. 
Ultimately, then, Christ’s voice in The Epistles seems to echo the same theme of 
delayed gratification and self-restraint which we saw develop in the Ikhwān’s 
characterization of the afterlife in Chapter Two. For the promises of spiritual pleasure and 
joy Christ mentions, compounded with the promises of an absolute absence of all painful 
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aspects of bodily existence, provide a strong incentive for the believer to hold out 
patiently for the afterlife, living a life of moderation and tolerance in this world while 
refusing to succumb to the temptations of emotions which drive one to ill-will and 
ultimately fuel social discord.  
  Having finished with Christ, the Ikhwān turn next to the experiences of 
Muhammad and his followers. They write: 
أجسادهم إلى القتل تسليمهم  يدل على أن أهل بيت نبينا، عليهم السالم، كانوا يرون هذا الرأيمما 
حتى  يوم كربالء، ولم يرضوا أن يتولوا على حكم يزيد وزياد، وصبروا على العطش، والطعن والضرب،
فارقت نفوسهم أجسادهم، ورفعت إلى ملكوت السماء، ولقوا آباءهم الطاهرين محمداً وعلياً والمهاجرين 
م ورضوا عنه، ولو لم يكن القوم مستيقنين اتبعوهم في ساعة العسرة، الذي رضي هللا عنه واألنصار الذين
....أجسادهم، وتسليمها إلى القتل والضرب والطعنالهالك  تعجلوا ببقاء نفوسهم بعد مفارقة أجسادهم، لما  
Among the evidence that points to the fact that the people of the house of our 
prophet, peace be upon them, were of this opinion [that the soul survives the body 
after death] is their surrendering of their bodies to the killing on the day of 
Karbalā’. They did not see it fit to recognize the rule of Yazīd and Ziyād.
18
 They 
endured thirst, stabbings, and beatings, until their souls left their bodies and rose 
to the Kingdom of Heaven. There they met their virtuous ancestors whom God 
was pleased with – Muhammad, Ali, and the immigrants and supporters who 
followed them in the times of hardship. If these people had not been certain of the 
fact that their souls would survive after leaving their bodies, then they would not 
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.  Appointed governor of Iraq by the second Umayyad Caliph Yazīd, Ubayd Allah 




have been so steadfast in surrendering their bodies to killings, beatings, and 
stabbings.... (Rasā’il 33; vol. 4)  
 
The Ikhwān’s mention of the Day of Karbalā’(680 C.E.) here, on which Ali’s son Ḥusayn 
and his followers were martyred at the hands of the Umayyads
19
, serves to provide 
further support for the prioritization of the soul over the body as a key aspect of religion. 
For the immediate reasons behind the events at Karbalā’ had to do with the Umayyad 
Caliph Muʻāwiyah’s decision to appoint his son Yazīd as his successor, thereby for the 
first time implying a precedent of secular dynastic succession in Islam (Hodgson 200; 
Berkey 76). Yet many in the early Muslim community, among whom were Ḥusayn and 
his followers, known as ahl al-bayt, were against the idea that the Caliphate ought to 
function as a mere dynasty (Berkey 88). For the vision of the early Muslim community 
was that the Caliph would have a certain spiritual aptitude, able to not merely rule as a 
secular political leader, but also to ensure that the community maintain and carry forward 
the religion that God had sent down through Muhammad (Berkey 88). Muʻāwiyah’s 
ambitions to establish a dynasty in his own bloodline, then, were viewed by Ḥusayn and 
his followers as a distortion and abuse of the power originally meant for the office of 
Caliph by ahl al-bayt (Berkey 88). Faced with an army of Umayyads at Karbalā’ 
compelling him to swear allegiance to Yazīd, Ḥusayn adamantly refused, and the fighting 
thereby broke out (Hodgson 219). The massacre at Karbalā’ was remembered and 
mourned in Iraq for generations not only by the proto-Shīʻah, but also by many of the 
                                                          
     
19
.  For a concise discussion of the events of Karbalā’, see Hodgson 218 
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proto-Sunni’s as a sign of barbaric injustice and corruption on the part of the Umayyad 
state (Berkey 78-79). The Ikhwān, then, situated geographically close by in Basra, are 
likely mentioning Karbalā’ because it is an event with which the immediate population 
would have been closely familiar, and would have been able to associate with the theme 
of spiritual triumph of the soul over worldly oppression.  
More specifically, it seems that the Ikhwān might be implying a parallel between 
the experience of Ḥusayn in facing Yazīd and the experience of Moses in facing the 
Pharaoh. For in the same way that the Pharaoh is depicted as a corrupt ruler whose 
mandate extends only to this world of bodies, so too might we draw the conclusion that 
the Ikhwān saw Yazīd as a decadent ruler who had lived according to the desires of his 
body rather than out of an awareness of his soul. In the same way that Pharaoh’s 
sorcerers who converted to Judaism fearlessly submit their bodies to execution by their 
corrupt ruler rather than forgo their new found convictions in the one God, so too do the 
followers of Ḥusayn do a very similar thing when they sacrifice their bodies rather than 
agree to compromise their souls to the coercive rule of Yazīd. Likewise, the Ikhwān’s use 
of the Christian terminology  malkūt al-samā’ in describing the Karbalā’ martyrs’ ascent 
to heaven is perhaps a suggestion that the martyrs’ submission of their bodies to harm in 
order to live according to the greater principles of the soul finds a kind of parallel in 
Christ’s self-sacrifice on the cross. 
Finally, it should be pointed out that even though the memory of Karbalā’ served 





 the Ikhwān’s language in remembering the event seems to be very non-
sectarian and moderate nature. The Ikhwān do not seem to extend the blame for Karbalā’ 
to anybody except for Yazīd and Zīyad, and even in this case the language is relatively 
mild compared to what many in 10
th
 century Iraq would have been inclined to say about 
the Umayyads. Likewise, the ahl al-bayt in this passage are depicted not as an 
antagonistic faction with a pre-conceived political agenda, but as peaceful conscientious 
objectors, their conscience rooted in their spiritual conviction. It is only once they have 
no other option that they engage in fighting, not to vanquish the Umayyads, but because 
they would rather die than to live under a ruler who does not know the difference 
between the body and the soul.  
Having finished giving accounts of the three prophets and their followers, the 
Ikhwān turn next to the Greek philosophers, explaining how the beliefs and actions of 
each reflect ultimately the same basic concern with the soul to be found in the 
monotheistic religions. I will focus here specifically on the accounts the Ikhwān give of 
Socrates and Plato. Starting with Socrates, the Ikhwān write:             
 
جسده  هذا الرأي ويعتقدونه تسليم سقراطومما يدل على أن الفالسفة الحكماء المتألهين كانوا يرون 
وذلك أن هذا الرجل كان حكيماً من حكماء بالد يونان : للتلف، وتناوله شربة السم اختياراً منه
ورغب في سرور عالم األرواح ولذاتها،  أظهر الزهد في الدنيا ونعيمها وفالسفتها، وكان قد
لم الكون الفساد، افي المقام في ع هدهمودعا الناس إليها ورغبهم فيها، وزوريحانها  وروحها
                                                          
     
20
. See Berkey 88 for a concise but useful discussion of the political ramifications of 
Karbalā’ .  
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يسمعون حكمته وغرائب نوادر  . . . فأجابه إلى ذلك جماعة من أوالد الملوك وكبار الناس
....كالمه  
And the among the evidence that points to the fact that the wise philosophers were 
of this opinion and believed in it is Socrates’ surrendering his body to harm, and 
his choosing willfully to take the drink of poison. This man was a Wiseman from 
among the wise men of his Greece and its philosophers. He had shown self-
restraint from this world, its delights, and its pleasures, and desired instead to 
know the secrets of the world of spirits and its essence. He called people to this 
latter world and caused them to desire it likewise. He caused them to renounce 
residing in the world of generation and corruption.
21
 A group consisting of the 
sons of kings and high noblemen answered Socrates’ call, . . . listening to his 
wisdom and the curiosities of his stories (Rasā’il 34-35; vol. 4). 
The Ikhwān’s characterization of Socrates here is analogous especially to their 
characterization of Christ. For just as Christ gained his following of disciples via a pay it 
forward method of kindness and gentle persuasion, so too did Socrates take the same 
approach in gaining the respect and loyalty of the citizens of Athens. Further, in speaking 
of Socrates’ willingly drinking the poison which has been prescribed as his death 
sentence, the Ikhwān seem to be arguing that a central commonality between Socrates 
and the prophets is that none of the former showed any fear in the face of corrupt rulers 
who tried to crush their influence. For this passage seems to suggest that Socrates, like 
                                                          
     
21
.  This is the direct translation of the Arabic phrase “ʻālam al-kawn wal-fasād”, 
which is a Greek philosophical term referring to the impermanent and fleeting physical 
world. This term was likely borrowed from Aristotle, who wrote a work entitled “On 
Generation and Corruption”. 
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the prophets, was aware that only the body can be harmed by the decrees of kings. Like 
the prophets, Socrates in the final analysis looked not to the rulers of this world for his 
liberation, but to the world beyond in which the soul ultimately resides.  
That the Ikhwān hold something like this to be the case is further implied by the 
below passage, which more greatly details the moment of Socrates’ death. The Ikhwān 
write:   
 
ال تبكوا، : الحكماء والفالسفة حزناً عليه، فقال لهم بكى من حولهبها شربة السم ليشرولما تناول 
حكماء فضالء كرماء،  فإني وإن كنت مفارقاً لكم إخواناً حكماء فضالء فإني أذهب إلى إخوان لنا
إنما : وفالن، وعد جماعة من الفالسفة الحكماء الذين كانوا قد ماتوا قبله، فقالواوقد تقدمنا فالن 
.أنفسنا حين نفقد أباً حكيماً مثلك نبكي على   
When he went to drink the poison, the wise men and philosophers around him 
cried in sadness for him, so he said to them: “Do not cry. For even though I am 
leaving you, wise and brave brothers, I am going to our brothers [up there] who 
are wise, brave, and charitable. We have advanced person by person.” And he 
counted all the wise philosophers who had died before him. So they said to 
Socrates: “We cry for our own sake when we lose a wise father like you.”  
(Rasā’il 34-35; vol. 4) [My Emphasis] 
The Ikhwān’s characterization of Socrates’ last words in this passage raises a very 
important question. For unlike in the case of the Prophets, the Ikhwān do not suggest an 
explicit destination for Socrates’ soul in the afterlife. I have inserted the phrase “up there” 
parenthetically into Socrates’ words on the implicit assumption that on his death his soul 
indeed departed this world to go “up there” somewhere. Yet the line unaltered itself 
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simply reads: I am going to our brothers. Where exactly, then, do the Ikhwān think 
Socrates’ soul going in the afterlife, and where do they think the brothers he speaks of are 
located? It seems fair enough to assume that this place might be the “world of spirits”  
(ʻālam al-arwāḥ), to which the Ikhwān give direct mention in speaking of Socrates 
earlier. Should we assume, however, that this ʻālam al-arwāḥ is synonymous with malkūt 
al-samā? Should we expect that the martyrs at Karablā also met Socrates when they 
ascended to heaven? The Ikhwān seem to purposely leave the answer to these questions 
ambiguous. Perhaps we might conclude that they were afraid to come out on the public 
record with an explicit statement that Socrates ascended to the same heaven as the 
followers of the prophets, as such a statement would likely have stirred up a great deal of 
bitter rebuke and may have even placed their lives in danger. Or perhaps we may 
conclude that this passage indicates a belief that Socrates, despite his merits, did not 
achieve the full salvation characteristic of the monotheistic religions. 
 Yet in speculation, I lean toward the conclusion that the Ikhwān did indeed see for 
Socrates a kind of salvation quite similar to that which the Abrahamic religions came 
later to envision for the soul. For if we follow Bakhtin’s framework of the interplay 
between unitary and heteroglossic language, we are lead to the conclusion that the 
Ikhwān’s use of the term “ʻālam al-arwāḥ” in the case of Socrates does not likely suggest 
a belief in his spiritual inferiority, but rather an acknowledgment of the way in which his 
language, though superficially different form the language of the Abrahamic religions, 
nonetheless embodied the same underlying unity to be found in the prioritization of the 
soul over the body. For not only does Socrates’ death in this account seem to involve the 
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same core moral to be found in the stories of the prophets - that of eventual triumph for 
spiritual awareness over worldly corruption and deception – but furthermore, shortly after 
this account the Ikhwān go on to make a statement strongly suggesting that the pursuit of 
al-falsafah and the pursuit of al-sharī‘ah, though they may appear to speak different 
languages, are in effect one and the same pursuit. This statement comes in the context of 
a criticism directed by the Ikhwān against the philosophers and men of sharī‘ah in their 
own society who argue and disagree with one another to no end, failing to realize that 
their respective pursuits are ultimately of a common end. The Ikhwān write: 
يناقضون تارة الفلسفة بالشريعة، وتارة الشريعة بالفلسفة، فيقعون في الحيرة والشكوك، فيضلون  
.ويضلون  
Sometimes they contradict philosophy by appeal to sharī‘ah, and sometimes they 
contradict sharī‘ah by appeal to philosophy. So they fall into confusion and doubt, 
and they become misguided and misguide others (Rasā’il 36; vol. 4). 
This lament of the perpetual bickering between the philosophers and the more 
traditionally minded men of sharī‘ah, then, seems to imply that the Ikhwān were of the 
view that philosophy and sharī‘ah ought not to be understood as rival modes of thinking, 
but as complementary pursuits mutually beneficial and enriching to one another and 
likewise mutually beneficial to the aim of salvation for the soul. At the very least, the 
above statement might be read as further evidence of the Ikhwān’s aim to resolve 
perpetual conflict in their society by suggesting underlying compatibility between 
ostensibly conflicting ideas and beliefs.  
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What the Ikhwān say about Plato raises even more questions about the their view 
of salvation for the philosophers than the passage on Socrates. On Plato, the Ikhwān 
write: 
 
بقاء النفوس أفالطون حكيم اليونانيين كان يرى هذا الرأي ويعتقده، يعني  ومما يدل على أن
لو لم يكن لنا معاد نرجو فيه الخير، : قوله في بعض حكمته الجسد، وصالح حالها بعد مفارقة
ين، اطالشي الطبيعة وجوار نحن هاهنا غرباء في أسر: لكانت الدنيا فرصة األشرار، وقال أيضاً 
.بجناية كانت من أبينا آدم، وكالم نحو هذاعالمنا  أخرجنا من  
Among the evidence that points to the fact Plato, the great Wiseman of the 
Greeks, was of this opinion – we mean the survival of souls and their betterment 
after leaving the body – is his saying that “If there were no afterlife in which we 
seek the good, then this world would be opportune for all evils.” He also said: 
“We here in this world are estranged in the prison of nature and the company of 
devils. We were expelled from our [true] world because of the transgression of 
our father Adam”, and other sayings like this. (Rasā’il 35; vol. 4) 
In this passage, the exact phrase used to refer to the “afterlife” which Plato speaks of is 
al-maʻād. Meaning literally “the return”, al-maʻād is a common Islamic synonym for al-
ākhirah, which refers to the afterlife in Islamic theology (Ibn Manẓūr, “ ʻ-w-d.”). Why do 
the Ikhwān place this Islamic term in the historical mouth of Plato? Just as in the case of 
Socrates, I propose that this language be read in the Baktinian sense, as the result of an 
effort to imply that the Greek philosophers were able to achieve salvation for the soul 
much in the same way that the prophets were. Yet the effect seems to be slightly different 
here in the case of Plato. For while the use of the more Greek sounding term ‘ālam al-
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arwaḥ  in the case of Socrates seems to acknowledge the presence of different historical 
circumstances as centrifugal forces which underlie the unitary Islamic understanding of 
the soul, the emphasis here upon  the term ma‘ād  as spoken by Plato seems to place the 
stress in the opposite direction: it  instead more greatly emphasizes the common unity 
that transcends through different historical circumstances. For in uttering the common 
Islamic term al-ma‘ād, Plato appears to function in the discourse of the The Epistles as a 
historically corroborative anchor for the Ikhwān’s belief that the human soul will 
eventually “return” to its Creator. A similar observation might be made regarding Plato’s 
claim to have been expelled from the Garden of Eden via the transgression of Adam. For 
this remark suggests that the Ikhwān saw Plato’s wisdom as early corroboration for their 
belief that the eternal human soul, because of its embodiment in this impermanent world, 
finds itself in a predicament from which it must strive to redeem itself. The Ikhwān’s 
grounding of Islamic language in the historical voice of Plato, then, seems to be 
somewhat the result of an effort to characterize Plato as having been aware, if only 
tacitly, of the same basic truth that the religion of Islam came to later.  
Perhaps the most informative part of all in the Ikhwān’s discourse on the prophets 
and the philosophers is the conclusion to this discourse. The Ikhwān write: 
 
....أفترى أن أهل الديانات كلها اتفقوا على شيء ال حقيقة له؟ كال  
 
Can you possibly imagine it to be the case that people of all of the religions have 
agreed upon on something that has no truth whatsoever? Of course not. (Rasā’il 




This concluding rhetorical question suggests that one of the strongest reasons the Ikhwān 
saw for the need to cultivate the human soul was found in their view that the survival of 
the soul beyond the body is a perennial truth. For the line of argument which the Ikhwān 
appear to be adopting here might be couched and illustrated in terms of the following 
statements:  
 
1. If many different parties from different historical times and places all arrive at 
the same basic conclusion C, then C must be true. 
2. The philosophers, the prophets, and their respective followers are different 
parties that came from different historical times and places. 
3. The philosophers, the prophets, and their respective followers each arrived at 
the conclusion C: that the body is ultimately impermanent while the soul is 
ultimately real and eternal. 
__________________________________________________________________ 
4. Therefore, C must be true.  
 
In other words, the Ikhwān here are citing their belief that the religions and their 
followers have independently arrived at conclusion C to be in itself evidence for the 
consequent truth of C, and very strong evidence at that. This concluding argument, then, 




Up to now, I have drawn upon Bakhtin’s dialogic criticism in order to argue that 
the Ikhwān envision their view of the soul as a perennial truth. To use Bakhtin’s 
language, this perennial truth is such that it is grounded in a common metaphysical unity 
while at the same time expressed and re-confirmed via a diversity of concrete historical 
voices found in the differing respective experiences of the prophets and the philosophers. 
By grounding the language of the soul in the heteroglossic experiences of different 
spiritual traditions, The Epistles appear ultimately to carve out a space in which dialogue 
and coexistence between Islam and other religions is rendered possible.  
A characterization of the Ikhwān’s irenic view of religion cannot be complete, 
however, without a consideration of its limits. The most serious question that must be 
asked is regarding the practical limits of the Ikhwān’s discourse on the soul is that which 
pertains to salvation. Although the Ikhwān acknowledge the experiences of Moses and 
Christ in Epistle 44, does this necessarily mean that they viewed Jews and Christians in 
practice as equally capable of attaining the same salvation which the Quran promises for 
pious Muslims? Although it may initially seem easy to interpret Epistle 44 as a message 
of universal salvation for those who have awareness of the soul, this argument appears to 
run into certain obstacles. For Epistle 44 seems to impose a hierarchical characterization 
upon the pre-Islamic religions as means toward salvation of the soul, placing Christianity 
over Judaism. The clearest suggestion of such a hierarchical characterization can be 
found in the Ikhwān’s quite critical claims that the Israelites were superficially 
impersonating the true religion of their prophet Moses, and therefore were in need of 
Christ’s assistance in order to turn them again toward the right path. Relative to the 
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language used to describe the followers of the other religions, the language used to 
describe the Jews seems to be quite harsh. Perhaps, however, the Ikhwān’s 
characterization of Christ’s prophecy as a kind of reform to the religion of Judaism was 
not so much a criticism of  10
th
 century Jews as it was the result of the effort to be faithful 
to prevailing perceptions of history. In fact, on a closer look the presence of Christian 
themes might be said to disproportionately dominate in Epistle 44.Why for instance does 
the account of Christ’s words seem to be based more upon extant Christian sources, while 
the account of Moses comes mostly from the Quran? Does this feature of Epistle 44 then 
suggest that the Ikhwān were more sympathetic to the Christian religion as a means to 
salvation than they were to the Jewish religion? In the end, we can only speculate. 
Although it is difficult to be sure about whether Epistle 44 reflects belief in the 
possibility of equal salvation for Jews and Christians alike, it seems at the very least to 
reflect a belief in peaceful coexistence among the different faiths as necessary for the 
greater public welfare. That the Ikhwān saw such coexistence as necessary is particularly 
apparent in the following earlier commentary on the hostility among different 
denominations and religions in their society. In Epistle 31, The Ikhwān write:  
عضاً، كما يفعل النواصب والروافض والجبريةوأهل الشرائع المختلفة يقتل بعضهم بعضاً، ويلعن بعضهم ب  
وكذلك في الملة العبرانية مثل العينية والسمعية، وفي الملة  .والقدرية والخوارج واألشاعرة وغير ذلك
.وما بينهما من الخالف السريانية كالنسطورية واليعقوبية  
. . . 
ق الذي يجمعهم على بالح إال المعرفة . . .ثم اعلم أنه ال يصلح بين أهل الديانات وال يؤلف بين المتعاديات   
.كلمة التقوى  
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 . . .  
....فهو ال يزدرع الحق في قلبه. . .  فمن رأى نفسه معادية لطائفة من الطوائف   
 
The people of the different religions kill each other, and they condemn each other, 
just as the Nawāṣib
22
 and the Rawāfiḍ
23
 and the Jabarīyah
24
 and the Qadarīyah
25
 
and the Kharijites and the ‘Asha‘rites
26
 do. And likewise in the Hebrew religion 
there are the Karaites and the Rabbinites, and in the Syraic religion there are the 
Nestorians and the Jacobites and the differences between them 
… 
                                                          
     
22
.  This is a sectarian and pejorative Islamic term used by Shiʻis to refer to those who 
allegedly condemn Ali ibn Abi Talib and the ahl al-bayt. Ibn Manẓūr defines the term in 
the following way: qawmun yatadayyinūna bi-baghḍat ‘Ali. (A group that bases their 
religion off of hating Ali) See “n-ṣ-b”. 
 
     
23
.  rawāfiḍ, meaning “deserters” is a sectarian term used by Sunni leaning Muslims to 
refer to the Shi’is and ahl al-bayt as deserters of the Islamic community due to their 
alleged refusal to recognize the first four rashidūn caliphs as legitimate rulers. (Kohlberg, 
387)   
 
     
24
.  A theological sect of Islam that believed that God controls all human actions 
though determinism and that free will does not really exist (“Al-Jabarīyah”, par. 1). 
 
     
25
.  Against the determinist position of the Jabarīyah, the Qadarīyah were proponents 
of human free will (Hodgson 264). 
 
     
26
.  Named after the founder Abu al-Ḥasan al-ʻAshʻarī (d. 935-6), the Ashʻarites were 
an Islamic interpretive school that tried to accomplish a synthesis between the very 
traditionalist approach of the Hanbalī school and the more rationalist approach of the 
Muʻatazlī school. (Berkey 148). 
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Know that there is nothing that makes amends between the people of different 
religions, and nothing that brings together enemies, . . . except for knowledge of 
the truth which unites them in heedfulness of God. 
. . .  
 So he who sees himself as an enemy to any particular religious group . . . has not 
planted in his heart the truth that binds them all together. (Rasā’il 161; vol. 3). 
 
The common unifying truth the Ikhwān are referring to in this passage seems to be the 
same perpetually corroborated doctrine of the permanence of the soul which they speak 
of in Epistle 44. We might conclude, then, that the Ikhwān are appealing to the common 
unity which underlies the diversity of religious practices in order to tell us that each 
religion bears a means toward reconciliatory dialogue with the others by appeal to the 
basic kernel of truth which they all share. This kernel of truth, as is spelled out in Epistle 
44, is found in the fundamental concern for realizing the distinction between the body 
and the soul, as well as the need to carry out one’s actions in a manner that accords with 
knowledge of that distinction.  
Therefore, although the apparent message of religious harmony in Epistle 44 
likely had its limits in practice, I am still inclined to argue that the language of the 
Ikhwān on the different religions is relatively tolerant and irenic for its time, especially 
when compared to some of the very harsh and more close-minded sectarian language 
which can be found in other sources from around the same period. Consider, for instance, 





 to his governor in Baghdad concerning the way in which those who denied the 
Caliph’s official doctrinal stance on the Quran should be dealt with. 
فقد كذب بشر  . . .وما أمسك عنه من أّن القرآن مخلوق . . .فأما ما قال المغرور بشر بن الوليد 
.في ذلك وكفر، وقال الزور والمنكر  
  . . .  
 وأنصصه عن قوله في القرآن واستتبه منه
 . . .  
إذ كانت تلك المقالة الكفر الصراح   
 . . .  
وإن أصر على شركه ودفع أن يكون القرآن مخلوقا بكفره وإلحاده، فاضرب عنقه، وابعث إلى  
. أمير المؤمنين برأسه  
As far as what the Bishr bin al-Walīd
28
 the deluded has said . . .  in his refusal to 
recognize that the Quran is created, . . . he has lied and committed blasphemy. He 
has said the words of falsehood and that which God condemns.  
. . .  
I command him to rescind what he has said about the Quran, 
. . .  
                                                          
     
27
.  Begun by al-Ma’mūn in 833 C.E., and ended by al-Mutawakkil in 848 C.E, the 
mihna was a public inquisition which required all religious judges, or qadis,  to swear an 
oath acknowledging the rationalist Muʻtazilī doctrine that the Quran was the created word 
of God rather than the eternal word of God (Berkey 126). Al-Ma’mūn sanctioned the 
torture, imprisonment, and in some cases even the killing of those religious judges who 
refused to swear the oath (Nawas 705) . 
 
     
28
.  Bishr ibn al-Walīd was among several of the judges who refused to swear the oath 




for those statements are blatant heresy 
. . .  
And if he insists upon this idolatry of his idolatry and refuses via his heresy and 
atheism  that the Quran is created, then chop off his head and bring it to the 
Caliph (al-Tabari 640-41; vol. 8).  
In his letter, Al-Ma’mūn goes on to criticize other dissenting religious judges in a similar 
manner, accusing them of atheism and unbelief due to their difference of opinion about 
the Quran. In contrast to the language of al-Ma’mūn, then, the language of the Ikhwān on 
religious piety appears quite inclusive indeed. For while al-Maʻmūn took a single 
religious doctrine espoused by one ideological sect (the Muʻtazilah), and tried to impose 
this doctrine on the religious judges by intimidation and force, it is reasonably apparent 
that the language of the Ikhwān bears no such impulse. Moreover, al-Ma’mūn’s use of 
judgmental words like kufr and ilḥād in describing religious scholars who did not believe 
in the createdness of the Quran seems to be reduce the concept of piety to contingency 
upon a very narrow and ultimately somewhat pedantic debate. In contrast, the Ikhwān’s 
language of the eternal soul and the temporal body appears to ground the notion of piety 
in a far more fluid and timeless paradigm, a more flexible paradigm that allows for 
differences of opinion and practice so long as they result from the same underlying 
spiritual concern. 
 In this regard, I think we ought to do more than simply write off Epistle 44 as a 
clumsy attempt at syncretism or a bizarre effort to justify Greek philosophical ideas by 
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cloaking them in the guise of Islamic terminology. Surely many fair arguments might 
exist for reading the Epistle in the former way. Yet the formalized argumentative 
structure that the Ikhwān employ in order to frame Epistle 44 suggests that their aim was 
not so much an aim of sheer eclecticism as it was an aim of purposeful persuasion. In 
writing Epistle 44, it seems that the Ikhwān aimed to persuade their contemporaries that 
there exists a common spiritual truth in which each of the different religious have had 
some facilitative and contributive role to play. That the Ikhwān mention such a diversity 
of religions in the 10
th
 century is in itself indicative of a relatively far-reaching vision of 
practical goodwill. For the Middle East until the 13
th
 century had a population that was 
majority non-Muslim. Any 10
th
 century effort to further the public good in the Muslim 
lands, then, would be amiss not to acknowledge the importance of pre-Islamic religious 
traditions. Though it is hard to say whether the Ikhwān believed in the same possibility of 
salvation for non-Muslims, then, it seems that they, as Muslims, tended toward a fairly 
broad conception of human spirituality ultimately indebted to and enriched by the 
existence of religious pluralism. While the irenic nature of the Ikhwān’s message was not 
“absolute” according to the way we are inclined to idealize the term “irenic” today, and 
while it likely had its limits in practice, I think we ought not to shy away from the 
conclusion that the Ikhwān’s message was nonetheless irenic for its time. At a time when 
the stability of the Islamic society was becoming ever more threatened by the polarizing 
influences of emerging sectarian consciousness between and among different religions, 
The Epistles can be read as a concerted attempt to mitigate these polarizing influences 
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through a re-emphasis upon and re-articulation of the common spiritual end to which 




The Epistles as a Response to the Clash of Civilizations 
 
Over the course of this Thesis, I have argued for the presence of a noteworthy 
irenic message in The Epistles of the Goodwill Brethren of Basra. In chapter one, I 
examined the question of the Brethren’s anonymity as authors of The Epistles, and how 
this anonymity functions within the text in order to carve out and envision a public sphere 
of brotherhood in which a range of individuals may participate in voice and in action so 
as to increase social cooperation and mitigate strife. Chapter two took up the question of 
the Brethren’s humanist view of the soul, and how this view is closely related to their 
efforts to promote practices of goodwill and tolerance among the disparate social classes 
and religious identities which formed the patchwork of 10th century Arabo-Islamic 
society. Chapter three examined the corroborative character of pre-Islamic wisdom in The 
Epistles, showing how the Brethren argue that the priority of the soul over the body is 
shared and confirmed by the teachings and experiences of Judaism and Christianity, as 
well as those of the ancient philosophers. 
   How might The Epistles as an irenic text from the Islamic middle ages present a 
framework whereby we might respond to the Clash of Civilizations narrative which has 
been applied so widely and vigorously in the conversations of the post 9/11 world? While 
the Clash of Civilization’s theory places an emphasis upon a historical separation and 
isolation between “Islamic civilization” and “Western civilization”, The Epistles appear 
to place an emphasis instead on exchange, interaction, and ultimately interdependency 
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between Islam and the Judeo-Christian and Hellenistic traditions which came prior to it. 
To a large degree, the Clash of Civilizations theory radicalizes Islam, framing the religion 
as necessarily opposed to celebrated “Western” cultural values like intellectual openness, 
free inquiry, and pluralism. Yet The Epistles show us a conception of Islamic practice 
that in fact seems to bear many points in common with the latter “Western” values. For 
the Islam The Epistles show us is one that is not rigid and literalist, but fluid, dynamic, 
and grounded in the ever-evolving human pursuit of wisdom, self-understanding and self-
betterment.  
The view of The Epistles I have taken in this thesis is quite different from and 
even contrary to that which many prior scholars of the Ikhwān have taken. I have argued 
that the Brethren’s conception of Islam is not so much the product of a clandestine 
organization that stood on the fringes of society, but rather that of a cooperative 
brotherhood which sought by its own means to actively engage the social and political 
spheres at the center stage of the medieval Islamic world, spreading religious and 
philosophical wisdom with the ultimate aim of creating a more enlightened and tolerant 
society.  
There is an Islamic organization in our own society that is trying to promote an 
irenic vision of tolerance similar to that which the Ikhwān tried to promote. This 
organization is trying to foster a sense of community and mutual dialogue between 
Muslims and non-Muslims in America, so that this country may begin to heal beyond the 
language of “us versus them” which so feeds the attitudes of political and religious 
extremism. Yet unfortunately, this is the very same organization which Newt Gingrich 
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has likened to Islamic radicalism. This organization is Feisal Abdul Rauf’s Cordoba 
Initiative, of which the Park 51 Islamic Community Center is just one integral part. Rauf 
hoped for Park 51 to be a place where inter-faith dialogue could take place (Higgins, par. 
4). He envisioned Park 51 as contributing to the community in the same way that the 
Jewish Community Centers and the YMCA have, providing a public space of recreation, 
education, and civic engagement (Hernandez, par. 10). As if to respond directly to the 
Clash of Civilizations narrative,  Abdul Rauf said in a video interview with ABC News 
that the real conflict is not between Islam and America, but between “the moderates of all 
religions and the radicals of all religions.” His words might be said to echo the essential 
message of the Brethren – that the success of radicalism and the perpetuation of religious 
violence feed off of nothing other than the failure of moderation, the absence of 
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